Research On Co-opetition Effect And Alliance Decision In The Shipping Supply Chain

Maritime shipping service characterized by low cost and high efficiency has become the main mode of world trade and transportation,transporting 90% of global trade every year.With the in-depth development of international trade and globalization,maritime logistics has become more and more important in a world where global partnerships continue to deepen,but it is also being carried out in an increasingly turbulent environment.The diversification of demand,the oversupply of the shipping market,and the frequent fluctuations of freight rate have made the competition of shipping services more and more fierce.Meanwhile,the great overlap of the hinterland,the transitional construction of infrastructure,and the equalization of transportation routes also aggravate the competition between ports.In this era of competition and cooperation,the operators of port and shipping companies are seeking new operating methods to survive and develop.In order to ensure the profits,shipping companies will form horizontal shipping alliances.In order to overcome the inefficient use of resources and deal with the powerful shipping horizontal alliances,the integration of the horizontal alliances for ports has also become a cooperative trend.In addition,it is a common practice for shipping companies to form vertical alliances with ports.Thus,will the multiple forms of alliances in the port and shipping industry surely become the “magic weapon” for coping with the fierce competition? What are the motives and influences behind the different forms of these alliances? What are the linkage relationships between the competition and cooperation effect in the different levels and alliance decision-making? Based on these issues,this paper conducts research on the effects of competition and cooperation in the shipping supply chain and alliance decisions.Through the analysis of the different competition and cooperation structures and alliance forms in the shipping supply chain,the use of competition and cooperation motivation to interpret the adjustment of the port and shipping structure is essential to accelerate the restructuring and strategic transformation of the port and shipping company.To this end,this paper has conducted a series of in-depth studies,as follows:First,this article investigates the incentive and coordination of horizontal shipping alliances.By constructing a “1vs.2” shipping supply chain structure consisting of a port and two shipping companies,three comparative models have been established: The centralized model(scenario OS),the port-shipping company game model(scenario CP),and the port-shipping company horizontal alliance game model(scenario Cs P),and the incentive factors and value of forming a shipping horizontal alliance have been discussed.The research results show that horizontal shipping alliances can soften downstream service competition,lower port service charges,and weaken the port monopoly.Combining the optimal strategies for shipping companies and port,when shipping companies’ service competition is not fierce and the marginal service cost range is limited,both shipping companies and port will choose scenario CP.In this case,scenario CP is a win-win situation.Comparing the system profits in the three models,it is found that the system profits under the scenarios CP and Cs P are lower than that under that in the scenario OS.That is,the scenario OS has maximized the system profit.Meanwhile,a revenue-sharing and service-cost-sharing contract has been designed to coordinate the shipping supply chain to maximize system profit.When shipping company’s revenue-sharing ratio and the port’s service-cost-sharing ratio are within reasonable ranges,this contract can achieve a win-win situation.Besides,the use of a compensation mechanism breaks the blind zone of the designed contract.Given the fairness of compensation,a Nash bargaining fair compensation model is proposed,which shows that the bargaining power of shipping supply chain members is positively correlated with their final profits.Second,this paper discusses the strategy of port horizontal integration.A stylized model of the “2 vs.1” shipping supply chain has been constructed,in which two ports provide competitive services on a common hinterland while performing regional integration practices,and both are directly connected to the same shipping company.To explore the impact of homogeneous service competition and regional synergy effects,a three-stage non-cooperative game is adopted to measure the impact of integration efforts of heterogeneous ports in the region on stakeholders in the shipping supply chain.Among them,port integration effort is manifested in reducing unit operating costs.Research shows that the integration of ports in the alliance will reduce port service charges,and the efforts of different main ports are more sensitive to the impact of their own service charges than that of the competing port.Surprisingly,the reduction in port service charge caused by the joint efforts of ports is not necessarily higher than that of individual port.Meanwhile,the integration effort will also reduce shipping companies’ freight rates and attract more market demand for port.However,when the competitive effect of regional alliance is stronger than synergistic effect,it will reduce the market demand of competitor port in the region.With the continuous deepening of the integration process of the port’s horizontal alliance,the downstream market demand will expand rapidly,and the ports in the alliance will get more calls at this time.In addition,when the synergy effect is weak,the joint efforts of the two ports are a classic Prisoner’s Dilemma,and when the synergy effect is strong,the joint efforts will turn into the Pareto-optimum.Third,this paper discusses the vertical cooperation model under the chain-chain service competition.By constructing a “2 vs.2” parallel shipping supply chain structure composed of two shipping companies and two ports,the influence of service competition between different supply chains on the vertical cooperation model of port and shipping companies has been studied.Through the strategic matrix composed of two vertical cooperation modes of port-shipping company alliance and commercial cooperation,the system equilibrium strategy and individual optimal strategy are derived,and the conditions of port-shipping company alliance that can realize the benefits of ports and shipping companies are determined.The research results show that no matter what kind of cooperation model the rival chain is,as long as the profit distribution is in a reasonable range,the port-shipping company alliance is always a dominant strategy and can bring advantages in service quality and demand,while this dominant strategy will hurt the interests of competitors.The equilibrium state of shipping system depends on the distribution of the alliance’s profit.The marginal service cost and the intensity of service competition between chains only affect the stability of the equilibrium strategy,and not affect the outcome of the selection.When the profit sharing ratio is controlled within a reasonable range and the competitor chain adopts commercial cooperation,the port-shipping company alliance is a win-win situation.The overall profit of the shipping system has been maximized.By comparing system equilibrium and individual optimum,it is found that when both chains form a port-shipping company alliance,a Prisoner’s Dilemma will appear.This is a lose-lose situation and damages the profit of the shipping system.Fourth,this paper discusses the vertical structure evolution of the port and shipping supply chain.In a two-tier shipping supply chain consisting of competitive ports and competitive shipping companies,this paper uses a bilateral bargaining game theory to build three types of shipping supply chain: Port-shipping company alliance,decentralized vertical integration,and network cross-dock.Analyze the value of the vertical structure under different competitive environments and discourse powers,and derive the evolution law of the vertical structure of shipping companies through the consistency and conflict of structure preferences.The research results show that the port-shipping company alliance has the advantages of low freight rates and high market demand,but it may reduce the overall performance of the system.Vertical integration helps to weaken channel competition and enhance the monopoly of ports,but it has the disadvantages of high freight rates and low market demand.Cross-docking will increase the port’s pricing power and throughput,but it will introduce internal port competition.With the increase in the bargaining power of shipping companies and the degree of competition among ports,the stable state of the vertical structure of the port and shipping supply chain has evolved from the two structures of port and shipping vertical alliance and cross-docking to only a cross-docking structure,and finally a vertically integrated structure.However,during the evolution of the vertical structure,the port and shipping system will gradually lose its advantages in pricing and market demand.In addition,from the perspective of the overall system,the research results also show that the stable state of evolution can achieve the Pareto-optimum of system profit.