Research On Fare Adjustment Mechanism For China’s High-Speed Railway Passenger Transport Based On The Perspective Of External Competition

China has been continuously building high-speed railways,with its rapid development,the high-speed railway has taken up a large proportion in the scale of railway passenger transport and become the main mode of passenger transport.The marketization of high-speed railway passenger ticket price is a significant part of the reform.The study has beneficial effects on straightening out relations with other transportation methods,thereby promoting the healthy development of the industry.In 2016,the price of high-speed railway passenger ticket pricing method was transferred from government-guided pricing to company’s autonomous pricing.However,in the past five years,those high-speed railway passenger transport enterprises were still in the fare of the government pricing period,the market-based high-speed rail fare adjustment mechanism has not yet been formed.The reform is not achieved overnight,but if the government-guided pricing method is still used,it will bring regulatory risks due to information asymmetry and other reasons.It remains to be seen whether the price fluctuations will harm consumer welfare if the tickets are priced by enterprises independently and questioned as feasible "monopoly".This dilemma has become an obstacle in the process of high-speed rail fare market reform,and the key to get out of the dilemma is to clarify the competition situation of passenger transport market.On the premise of "Industry≠Market" and considering the competition of different products,the significant competition between high-speed railway passenger transport and air passenger transport indicates external competition constraint in the industry,the market mechanism can be given full play to adjust the price of high-speed railway passenger transport enterprises.On the contrary,it is necessary for the government to implement price regulation to avoid the "monopoly" risk and low efficiency caused by lack of incentive.Focus on the competition situation between high-speed railway passenger transport and air passenger transport,the paper makes an empirical analysis on the competition by using various measurement methods based on the new industrial organization theory and data of high-speed railway passenger transport and air passenger transport fares and volume,to investigate the existence of competition(cross elasticity of demand),the product differentiation competition range(geographic distance produce products differences)and upper limit of price competition of the thread,the main conclusions are as follows:1.Through the establishment of high-speed railway passenger demand logarithm linear model and the use of 2SLS method to estimate its self-demand price elasticity.The study found that the high-speed rail passenger transport lacks price flexibility in the short distance,and is rich in price and elasticity in the middle and long distances,which indicates that the high-speed railway passenger transport in short distance has market forces of rising fares.In the case of different product demand,the logarithmic linear demand model is used to estimate the demand system of high-speed railway passenger transport and air passenger transport based on the iterative 3 SLS method.It is found that the price elasticity of cross-demand of high-speed rail and air passenger transport is positive,which confirms a significant substitution relationship between them,and indicates the asymmetric cross-elasticity.2.The mathematical model established found a competitive relationship between high-speed railway passenger transport,air passenger transport,highway and other transport industries within approximately 400 km,and 400 km-1000 km respectively,it can be inferred that there is no monopoly in the overall high-speed railway passenger transport market under external competition.Through multiple threshold regression test,it is found that high-speed railway passenger transport enterprises adopt different strategies to adjust fares in different distances due to different competition conditions and market forces.High-speed passenger transport enterprises face the competition with the highway passenger transport within the scope of short-distance trips,and the competition with air passenger transport within the scope of long-distance trips.Those high-speed railway passenger transport enterprises decide to cut the fares if they lack the competitive advantages in the market,or increase the fares in the market with less competition.3.Taking the ticket price adjustment of Beijing-Shanghai high-speed railway at the end of 2020 for the first time as a quasi-natural experiment,this paper empirically examines the inhibiting effect of air ticket prices on high-speed railway ticket prices adjustment by using dual difference method.The study found that air fares will not rise due to the increase of high-speed railway fares,and aviation competition has a limited effect on the increase of high-speed railway fares.The reason is that the air passenger transport market has the market structure characteristic of monopoly competition,and the equilibrium price formed by its competition in the same industry is not vulnerable to be impacted by the rise of high-speed railway fares.In addition,due to the small increase of high-speed railway fare,the price spread is not enough to make consumers change their choice.It is precisely because of the "restraining effect" of the adjustment of high-speed railway fare,the regulation of passenger ticket price can be relaxed and the price can be adjusted by market mechanism instead.Based on the conclusions above,this paper considers that the market-oriented reform of high-speed railway passenger ticket price should not be regulated or liberalized in a"one-size-fits-all" manner,but should be implemented according to the competition status and gradually promoted in accordance with the degree of competition.On the basis of classification of passenger transportation markets in different regional competitive advantages,enterprises should implement floating price strategy according to the competitive condition.In the market with strong competition,enterprises have more independent pricing power,and the government can gradually loose the regulation.In the market with weak competition or without any competition,some government regulations of ticket price should be retained.In the market where enterprises have higher independent pricing rights,anti-monopoly policy should perform effectively to fully maintain market competition order.The innovation of this paper is as follows:firstly,the paper uses the theory of industrial organization,especially the method of anti-monopoly economics,focuses on explaining the adjustment mechanism of high-speed railway ticket price from the perspective of external market competition;Secondly,the paper employs the micro-level data to measure the price elasticity,uses threshold regression,differential and other methods to analyze the impacts of alternative competition on high-speed railway ticket price and scientifically quantify the essence of high-speed railway market competition,so that the analysis conclusions have a solid empirical analysis basis.Thirdly,the paper proposes a mechanism for adjusting high-speed railway ticket price based on market competition.The research ideas and methods of the paper can also be applied to the price regulation and market reform of other natural monopoly industries,especially those industries with network structure.