| Due to natural erosion and human activities,sediment siltation problem in rivers,lakes and reservoirs has become increasingly prominent.Sediment disasters have not only restricted the rapid development of production and life of people,but also seriously affected the functions of rivers,lakes and reservoirs.Since the 18 th National Congress of the Party,the Party Central Committee has put forward new national development strategies including the development of the Yangtze River economic belt,ecological protection and high quality development of the Yellow River Basin,adhering to the ecological priority and green development road and continuously exerting great ecological,economic and social benefits of green water and green mountains.Therefore,it is urgent to change the concept,renew the mind and utilize the sediments as resources,turning harm into profit and waste into wealth.The analysis and estimation for the Yellow River in the next 50 years show that the potential of sediment resource utilization in the future is great.From current production experience of sediment resource utilization,making scientific and effective utilization and carrying out research on the optimal allocation of sediment resources are essential and important.Morever,given different stakeholders involved in the optimal allocation of sediment resources,it is also necessary to consider the preference of multiple players or stakeholders and interaction relationship,use the cooperative negotiation method to determine the optimal equilibrium strategy,and coordinate the interests of different players,so as to achieve the cooperative optimization of the objectives with multiple competitive relationship and form an effective cooperative mechanism for optimal allocation of sediment resources.With the improvement of social production technology,the realization of the market utilization of ecological products processed by sediment resources and the increasing demand of people for beautiful ecological environment are constantly stimulating the market’s effective demand for ecological products.However,due to the natural properties of sediments and the lack of financial benefits caused by current conditions,most of the enterprise in the market is still willing but unable in the face of sediment resource utilization.Therefore,it is necessary to give full play to the role of government function management and market regulation and design effective incentive subsidy for sediment utilization enterprise to ensure reasonable income,and to restrict and encourage the behaviors of the participants.This study aims at the actual demand of sediment resource utilization,constructs a multi-objective optimal allocation model for sediment resources,puts forward the optimal allocation scheme of sediment resources,studies the balanced allocation mode of cooperation negotiation with multiple players,and establishes the incentive and supervisory mechanism for the coordination between government and enterprise,so as to construct a scientific and systematic theoretical system for sediment resource utilization from source allocation to market utilization.The specific contents of this study include:(1)The relationship between ecological,economic and social benefit objectives and decision variables of sediment allocation mode is analyzed,and the multi-objective optimal allocation model of sediment resources is constructed.The non-inferior solution of the model is obtained by using the ε-constraint method and Kuhn-Tucker condition,and the values of decision variables satisfying constraint conditions as the optimal equilibrium solution are determined by using the subjective trade-off rate method innovatively from the perspective of preference.The proposed model is applied to the Weishan and Bojili irrigation areas in China,and the corresponding optimal allocation scheme and measure of sediment resources are put forward.(2)Based on the idea of game theory,the bargaining game model of optimal allocation of sediment resources is established.The contradictory objectives in the optimal allocation model are portrayed as the conflict between the stakeholders of sediment resources.Nash bargaining and asymmetric Nash bargaining methods are used to solve the problem of the optimal allocation of sediment resources from the perspective of cooperative negotiation,the equilibrium strategy and cooperative allocation scheme of contradictory objectives are determined,and the influence of different disagreement utility points and bargaining weights on the results is analyzed and compared.Moreover,the idea of determining bargaining weights by using dynamic bargaining is discussed.(3)Based on the principal-agent relationship formed by the cooperation between the government and enterprise in the process of realizing market-oriented production of sediment resource utilization,in view of the moral hazard problem of enterprise,the government incentive mechanism model for sediment resource utilization is constructed.By simplifying the effort level of sediment resource utilization into discrete variable,the incentive compatibility and participation constraints of the model are analyzed,and the incentive mechanism model of sediment resource market utilization under asymmetric information is constructed.The optimal contract property of the model and the influence of the parameters including the reservation utility of enterpreise on the behavior subjects are analyzed,strengthening the incentive and constraint effect of the output on capital return of enterprise.The influence of asymmetric information on the information rent of the government is compared.(4)In view of the large information rent and inefficient incentive mechanism,the government supervisory mechanism model for sediment resource utilization is constructed.Based on the relationship between government,enterprise and supervisory group,the optimal contract property of the model,the optimal supervisory effort level and the influence of the supervisory effort level and the reservation utility of the supervisory group on the behavior subjects and benefits are analyzed.Through the trade-off of information rent and supervision cost,the optimal contract structure of incentive and supervisory mechanism is discussed,making the government incentive effect best and maximizing the efficiency of sediment resource allocation and the interests of each participant.The model is then analyzed and verified by a numerical example.(5)The government incentive and supervisory mechanism considering effort level as continuous variable is constructed to extend and supplement the incentive mechanism model.Through describing the effort level of sediment resource utilization as continuous variable and expanding the model parameters and assumptions,the government incentive and supervisory mechanism model is constructed.The government contract structure,the optimal effort level of the enterprise and the expected utility under incentive mechanism and supervisory mechanism are obtained respectively.The influence of relevant parameters on the optimal decision-making of government and enterprise and contract structure,the cost and benefit of the government after introducing supervision are analyzed,and the influencing factors for introducing supervisory mechanism are discussed.The management implications in market utilization of sediment resources are summarized.Results corroborate that,the multi-objective optimal allocation and incentive mechanism models proposed in this study can determine the optimal allocation scheme for the coordinated development of ecological,economic and social benefits and the virtuous cycle and cooperative utilization mode of sediment resources,further expand the research scope and research field of optimal allocation of resources,cooperative negotiation and incentive mechanism,and provide new ideas and decision-making reference for making rational utilization of sediment resources,improving sediment resource utilization efficiency and promoting the development of market-oriented industrialization of sediment resources,which has important practical significance. |
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