Research On Omnichannel Collaboration Strategy Of Retail Enterprises Based On Coupon Distribution

With the advancement of Internet technology,online shopping has received explosive growth.However,the rapid growth of online shopping has led to a sharp decline in the traffic of traditional physical stores and triggered a wave of serious closures of physical stores.As such,retail companies have to explore new ways for retail model transformation.Fortunately,the omnichannel retail model,integrating online and offline channels and meeting consumers’ seamless channel conversion and cross-channel experience,has ushered in a new opportunity for development.Specifically,omnichannel retail,on the one hand,attracts customers from online to offline,reducing the impact of online shopping on offline stores;on the other hand,online platforms can reach consumer terminals by using physical stores,enhancing the value of customers’ online shopping experience.Omnichannel retail can realize resource sharing and complementary advantages of online and offline.In this regard,the retail enterprise’s attention is naturally paid to the coordination between channels.Price is an important means for channel coordination,and price control strategies based on coupons are widely adopted in commercial practice.However,previous omnichannel-related researches focus on the issue of single price design,and less work is carried out from the perspective of consumer channel preference and channel structure.In contrast,the joint decision-making model of price and coupon value broadens the models for price control and channel coordination.Additionally,the emphasis of omnichannel operational strategy is on the integration of omnichannel retailers’ self-channels.Little attention has been paid to the integration policy in the presence of channel encroachment.Moreover,few works involved the case that omnichannel retailers sell differentiated products through different channels.With the increasing complexity of horizontal competition and cross-cooperation relationship among omnichannel numbers,it is necessary to study the omnichannel operational strategy under the competition of multi-body,multi-channel,and multi-brand combination.Therefore,focusing on the mainline of omnichannel coordination,this paper investigates the omnichannel pricing and coordination strategies of retail enterprises with coupon promotion,viewing coupons as a control variable.The objective of this study is to provide theoretical reference and practical guidance for online and offline operational optimization under marketing,improving the revenues of omnichannel retail enterprises.First,the issue of omnichannel coordination is discussed from the perspective of coupon value differences.Aiming at the omnichannel system in which the retailer opens the online,BOPS(Buy-Online-Pick-up-in-Store),and offline channels simultaneously,three decision models,namely,no-coupon,offering coupons with a common value,and offering coupons with a differentiated value,are constructed.The omnichannel coordination strategy with differentiated value is solved and compared.The study reveals that channel price under the case of offering a common value is equal to that case of offering a differentiated value.However,the retailer can regulate the actual payment of consumers and profit margin of the retailer by designing coupon value.Compared to the coupon promotion with a common value,the retailer is more likely to provide coupons with a differentiated value when the purchase spillover is sufficiently large.Moreover,the coupon value in the BOPS channel is higher than that of the online-only channel.Second,the issue of omnichannel coordination is explored from the perspective of consumer channel preference differences.Channel combinations and their formation conditions are analyzed with consumer channel preferences.Omnichannel coupon promotion models are built under different channel combinations.The influence of coupons on consumer channel selection and channel integration are investigated.The results show that,for consumers with a high travel cost,the retailer should open the online channel and then charge a low-price policy;for consumers with a great offline channel-experience value,the retailer should open the BOPS channel and then improve coupon promotion efforts.Furthermore,the retailer can raise the price of the BOPS channel and provide a large-value coupon to increase channel competitiveness when consumers purchase through the offline and BOPS channels.Third,the above monopoly environment is extended to the competitive environment where the omnichannel retailer suffers the e-tailer and physical retailer.The anti-invasion strategy based on coupon promotion and channel integration is discussed,and the strategy difference under different channel intrusion situations is explored.The analysis concludes that in the case of e-tailer encroachment,the omnichannel retailer should implement coupon promotion when the logistics cost is relatively high;whereas it should implement coupon promotion under a low logistics cost in the case of physical retailer encroachment.Besides,the omnichannel retailer should provide a larger coupon value under physical retailer encroachment than e-tailer encroachment when the BOPS channel shows an advantage.Fourth,the research further extends the case of a single decision body to the case of multi-decision bodies where the online retail enterprise(the manufacturer)and offline retail enterprise(the retailer)work together to build an omnichannel system.The omnichannel supply chain’s coupon coordination strategy under unified pricing and differentiated pricing between online and offline is examined.The cooperation relationship between supply chain members under different pricing powers is investigated.The results indicate that coupon promotion does not necessarily increase the revenue of the manufacturer and retailer,but depends on consumer types,channel preferences,and channel characteristics.In addition,when the hassle cost of the BOPS channel is relatively large,the prices and coupon values of the manufacturer and retailer under the case of differential pricing are higher than that case of unified pricing,while the manufacturer’s wholesale price is lower.The retailer can derive a higher profit under the differential pricing strategy,while the manufacturer’s profit is lower.Finally,this work further expands single product competition in omnichannel supply chain to multi-product competition.On the one hand,in the case of the manufacturer selling competing brands,four decision-making models are constructed,namely,no-coupon,only the manufacturer offers coupons,only the retailer offers coupons,and the manufacturer and retailer offer coupons simultaneously.On the other hand,in the case of the retailer introducing private labels,two decision-making models are constructed,namely,the manufacturer’s brand monopoly and the introduction of private labels of the retailer.The cooperation strategy of the omnichannel supply chain under different brand competition and coupon offering modes is explored through a balanced comparison.The results show that,from the perspective of the manufacturer selling competing brands,the manufacturer and retailer derive higher profits in the case of offering coupons unilaterally.Moreover,the manufacturer can benefit from the retailer’s coupon promotions.From the perspective of the retailer introducing private labels,the introduction of private labels will increase the price and coupon value of the BOPS channel when the wholesale price is relatively low.Moreover,the manufacturer derives fewer profits,while the retailer captures higher revenues with private labels.