Joint Decision Of Pricing-inventory And Coordination Under Omni-channel BOPS Supply Chain

In recent years,under the impact of the e-commerce industry and the novel coronavirus pneumonia,a large amount of inventory space of traditional offline physical stores is idle,and many offline retailers are faced with the crisis of continuous loss or even closure.Traditional offline retailers are eager to strengthen cooperation with online enterprises to realize the transformation and upgrading of sales mode.In the omnichannel retail model,Online and offline are highly integrated,among which the "Buy Online and Pick-up in Store"(BOPS)model has become a classic model attracting much attention in the industry.However,the introduction of omni-channel BOPS will not only affect the traditional online and offline operational decisions,but also challenge the cooperation model and profit distribution mechanism between enterprises.There are still many problems to be solved in the supply chain model of traditional online and offline retailers cooperating to operate BOPS channels.Based on the above background,this paper starts from the perspective of channel and resource integration between traditional online retailers and offline physical stores,and aims at the omni-channel BOPS mode of cooperation layout between online and offline retailers,considering the cross-selling and preference degree of self-service behavior brought by consumers when they reach stores.Supply chain game models under revenue-sharing contract and inventory subsidy contract are constructed respectively to discuss the conditions under which supply chain members should carry out BOPS channel cooperation under which contracts,and to study how cross-selling and consumer preferences in different contracts affect channel demand satisfaction rate,pricing and inventory decisions of online retailers,and profit of supply chain members.The research shows that,regardless of whether consumers have self-picking preferences,when consumers are sensitive to changes in commodity prices,both contracts can realize cooperation among supply chain members.When online cooperation willingness is weak,stores can better promote cooperation by appropriately reducing contract income.In order to meet the needs of BOPS channel consumers as much as possible and obtain greater profits,offline retailers should usually choose revenue sharing contract.Only when cross-selling is large and consumers’ preference for self-pick-up is small,inventory contract is better.On the contrary,for offline stores,when cross-selling is low or self-picking preference is high,the inventory subsidy contract is more profitable.High consumer pickup preference is not always beneficial to stores.In the revenue-sharing contract,if crossselling is low,high consumer pick-up preference will reduce the revenue of stores.Under the influence of the net profit of BOPS channel commodities and the contract mechanism,in the revenue sharing contract,when the market share of BOPS or the preference of consumers to self-pick decreases,online retailers can strategically reduce the inventory of BOPS channel,reduce the demand satisfaction rate of BOPS channel and guide customers to transfer to online channels for consumption,but in the inventory subsidy contract,it is just the opposite.This paper enriched and developed the relevant theoretical research under the omnichannel supply chain,and provided a reference for the practice of omnichannel cooperative business model of middle-line and offline retail enterprises.