The Study On Warranty Policy Design And Optimization In Supply Chain Environment

Facing the changing economic and social environment and the development needs of manufacturing enterprises,enterprises attach more and more importance to the warranty policy.When making the warranty decisions,the enterprises should pay attention to the high value-added extended warranty,warranty service level and market environment besides the product itself.Motivated by making better decisions,this dissertation focuses on warranty policy design and optimization in supply chain environment after comprehensively reviewing the recent related literature.The main research are organized as the following.First,the basic warranty period decision and extended warranty pricing strategy are jointly considered.A manufacturer-led supply chain consisting of one manufacturer,one retailer and one third-party service provider is studied.We analyze four extended warranty channel scenarios including none providing extended service,the manufacturer providing extended service,the retailer providing extended service and the third party providing extended service,and further discuss the situation where the manufacturer adopts wholesale price contract with the retailer in extended warranty sales.The results show that the manufacturer should shorten the basic warranty period when extended warranty is involved except for the third party providing the extended service.Adjustment of pricing decisions depends on the parameter relationship.When wholesale price contract is adopted,both the manufacturer and the retailer are better off and reach a win-win situation.Then,the optimal warranty service level is designed.We study a retailer-led supply chain consisting of one manufacturer,one retailer and one third-party service performer.Two scenarios are analyzed where the retailer performs the warranty service and the retailer outsources the warranty service to the third party.We also discuss the role of a cost-sharing contract between the retailer and the third party.Results show that when the initial investment of performing warranty service is relatively high,the retailer find it more profitable to outsource the warranty service to the third party.However,the optimal service level and the profit of the manufacturer decrease if the retailer choose to outsource the warranty service.A cost-sharing contract does improve the optimal service level and bring benefits to both the retailer and the manufacturer.But this contract injures the interests of the third party.Next,we consider the impact of the brand reputation on warranty's conveying product quality information.In a manufacturer-led supply chain consisting of two competing manufacturers and one retailer,the demand of products depends on price,brand and warranty period.A model for this problem is proposed when the manufacturers decide the warranty periods and the wholesale prices meanwhile the retailer decides the retail prices.We find that brand reputations influence all the optimal decisions of each party.Under certain condition,the strong brand manufacturer realises his profit maximisation by providing a shorter warranty compared to the weaker brand manufacturer,while charging a higher price.Last,optimal strategies under two different supply chain power structures are discussed after considering the impact of the brand reputation on warranty's conveying product quality information.Models are built in the supply chain consisting of one original design manufacturer and two competing brand retailers.We find that there exists a brand ratio interval in which the product named by the high-brand retailer will not get a better warranty from the manufacturer.Supply chain power structures don't affect the manufacturer's warranty decisions,the retailers' pricing strategies and the profit of the whole supply chain.Both the manufacturer and the two retailers are eager for the supply chain leadership which helps one get a higher proportion of the supply chain profits.