Research On Supply Chain Financial Financing Decision Under Order Pledge Mode

The rapid growth of the Internet lays a solider foundation for supply chain finance.Characterized by combination of service and information,B2B third-party platforms mix their information advantage with supply chain service,and hence realize high integration of logistics,information flow and cash flow,therefore providing practical solutions for the development of supply chain finance.Under the background of the Internet finance,this paper takes supply chain finance as the theme,and applies such theories as principal-agent,supply chain management and e-commerce to study the operation mode of supply chain finance and its monitor-incentive mechanism between participants is great significant.The paper chooses the order pledge financing mode as a representative,since this mode gives priority to the supply chain financing by downstream dealers,and mainly solves the problem of their shortage of funds.The mode features large financing amount and its main participants cross industries and sectors,it can be effectively decentralized and structuralized,thus becoming the most rapidly growing and most mature financing mode at home and abroad.Basically,the research on the content and characteristics of the order pledge financing mode covers other sunpply chain financing modes,so it is a representative study.Its content and conclusions are summarized as follows:(1)As for the order pledge financing mode based on offline supply chain,the paper studies supply chain coordination and optimization decision for dealers with capital constraints under random demands in terms of the internal coordination of supply chain.Under the condition of internal financing,we take into account the influence of the time value of money on the policymaking and performance of supply chain.Under the same situation,we also take the profit maximization expected by supply chain members as the objective function,and discuss the revenue sharing contract between dealers and producers during the supply chain profit allocation as well as the problem of supply chain coordination.Our study suggests that under the condition of internal financing,this contract can make dealers achieve their optimal order when they have no funding constraints,improve the revenue expected by all parts of the supply chain.Under the condition of external financing,effective allocation of supply chain profit increment can be realized through the introduction of financing cost sharing and transfer mechanism to motivate the optimal order without capital constraints.The paper also discusses the influence factors of supply chain coordination and the conditions of profit coordination.In addition,the interacting relationship among optimal order,dealer repurchase rate and bank loan interest rate is analyzed in consideration of the condition of dealers with or without the default risk.(2)As for the order pledge financing mode of online supply chain finance of based on the joint credit,the paper discusses the mode of joint credit granted by banks and B2B platforms when both of them are assumed to have a medium risk.In order to coordinate the interest relationship between banks and B2B platforms,we design an incentive and restraint model between them,and analyze the relative conditions of the motivational mechanism.Our study shows that under the condition of double moral hazard,the higher the bank loan efficiency is,the larger its benefit becomes.The more efficient B2B platform loan examination is,the larger its own profit becomes.In consideration of agent risk preference,the type of agent B2B platform risk does not affect the choice of both sides for the optimal credit effort level.Our study indicates that the optimal loan profit distribution proportion is proportional to the degree of B2B platform risk aversion,and inversely proportional to the uncertain expected revenue of loan,namely,the more significant the degree of B2B platform risk aversion is and the larger the loan recovery risk is,the smaller the optimal loan income distribution proportion becomes.(3)As for the order pledge financing mode of online supply chain finance based on the entrusted credit,the paper establishes a moral hazard model of hiding actions under the condition of medium risk.In consideration of its own benefits,the entrusted object B2B platform may be reluctant to disclose the real information of financing enterprises and will take the default risk of hiding due diligence,thus leading to the moral hazard of hiding actions and information,and resulting in the profit conflict between the principal of bank and the agent of B2B platform.Under the condition of moral hazard,the principal of bank designs incentive contracts only based on the results from the efforts of the agent of B2B platform observed by the principal.Although the contract is unable to directly give the agent of B2B platform reward according to its efforts,the principal of bank can motivate the agent of B2B platform to make more efforts at a reasonable cost through this contract.The feasible contract must conclude incentive contract and voluntarily participate contract.We firstly analyze the relative conditions of the incentive mechanism.Secondely we proved optimal income distribution ratio of banks is smaller than that based on joint credit,and when the agent of B2B platform has a risk aversion,the highest benefit distribution proportion accepted by banks is smaller than that by banks when the agent has a medium risk,Moreover,static game method is adopted to give dominant strategy of B2B platform under the moral hazard of hiding information.(4)As for the order pledge financing mode of online supply chain finance based on the unified credit,the paper mainly researches the principal-agent relationship between third-part logistics enterprises and dealers.How to effectively solve the principal-agent relationship between the two sides is the key to unified credit effectiveness,which can be summarized as a problem of incentive contract design under the condition of asymmetric information.We design the moral hazard model between third-party logistics enterprises and dealers,discuss relative conditions of the incentive mechanism when dealers have a risk aversion and a medium risk,and compare the changes of the highest income distribution proportion of third-party logistics companies accepted by dealers.In addition,we analyze the relationship among dealers' effort level,efficiency and income,as well as the condition of effective profit coordination between members so as to realize the overall utility maximization of the supply chain finance system.