Cooperation Strategy And Incentive Mechanism In An Offline To Online Supply Chain Under O2O Commerce

With the improvement of consumption level and the upgrading of consumption view,increasing consumers pay attention to consumption experience.However,pure online channel cannot satisfy consumers’ experience need.Then,more and more online retailers realize the importance of physical experience and begin to cooperate with offline showrooms.As a result,offline showroom develops rapidly.The introduction of offline showroom changes the structure of the original supply chain,which leads to more complex relationship between offline to online(O2O)supply chain members and increases the difficulty of cooperation between supply chain members.Based on this background,this thesis comprehensively uses principal-agent theory,signaling game,bargaining and numerical example,studies channel cooperation strategy and incentive mechanism in an O2 O supply chain,and analyze the impact of important parameters on the optimal decisions and profits of supply chain members.First,aiming at an O2 O supply chain with an offline showroom and an online retailer,we consider the impact of experience service,retail price of the product and the probability that the product fits consumers’ needs on demands.Then we design the optimal cooperative contracts under symmetric and asymmetric information.We also identify the impact of demand information asymmetry,return handling cost and the spillover effect of experience service on contract design and profits of supply chain members.Further,we conduct numerical examples to illustrate the above results intuitively.We find that the online retailer can adopt different contract design strategies under asymmetric information.In some conditions,information asymmetry does not reduce efficiency of the whole supply chain.We also find that the spillover effect of experience service does not always increase supply chain members’ profits.Second,we consider an O2 O supply chain with an offline showroom and an existing online retailer,and the offline showroom intends to introduce a new competing online retailer.We build a signaling game model under asymmetric demand information,and examine the impact of competition by comparing equilibrium results between different channel cooperation strategies.Then we investigate the offline showroom’s optimal channel cooperation strategy,and explore the impact of the introduction of competition and demand information asymmetry on the optimal decisions and profits of supply chain members.We find that under asymmetric information the introduction of competition brings negative information effect and positive service effect.The optimal channel cooperation strategy of the offline showroom depends on the trade-off between these effects.Due to positive service effect,competition increases the existing online retailer’s profit in some conditions.Besides,information disadvantage benefits the online retailers in some conditions.Third,aiming at an O2 O supply chain with an offline showroom and two competing online retailers,we consider the impact of experience service level and competition intensity on demand under uncertainty market environment.A dynamic game model among supply chain members is built.Comparing equilibrium results of supply chain members,we analyze the impact of demand forecast and then obtain the optimal demand forecast strategy of the offline showroom.Further,we explore the impact of the optimal strategy on the online retailers and the whole supply chain.Then we design the optimal demand forecast contract of the online retailers.We find that demand forecast generates both positive forecast revenue and negative signal cost.The optimal demand forecast strategy of the offline showroom depends on the joint impact of forecast revenue,signal cost and demand forecast cost.In some conditions,the optimal demand forecast strategy hurts both the competing online retailers and the whole supply chain,and the online retailers can encourage the offline showroom to change the optimal strategy by two demand forecast incentive contracts.Finally,considering an O2 O supply chain with an offline showroom and two competing online retailers,we build multistage game models under different forecast information sharing strategies.Then,we analyze the impact of information sharing through comparing equilibrium results among different strategies,and study the optimal information sharing strategy of the offline showroom and information sharing contract of the competing online retailers.Besides,we also examine the impact of competition on equilibrium decisions and profits of supply chain members under the optimal strategy.We find that the optimal information sharing strategy of the offline showroom depends on the joint impact of the competitive effect and the direct effect.Specially,the offline showroom is more likely to share forecast information voluntarily with higher competition intensity.We also find that in some conditions all supply chain members can obtain higher profits as competition intensity increases under the optimal strategy.