| This dissertation explores the moral rationality of familial dependence in old age. Beginning with a survey of the literature on family care of the elderly, it uses social phenomenology and sources in Anglo-American philosophy to analyze moral beliefs about dependent aging and to elaborate norms for family care of old people. It makes the case that counterdependent attitudes connected with the idea of negative freedom obscure the warrants for dependence in old age. It attempts to show that counterdependence, while it points to grounds for anxiety over dependence, derives from a deficient set of moral beliefs. It goes on to propose an alternate set of moral beliefs and basic attitudes which can account for filial responsibility and parental trust without underestimating the risks of dependence. Justification for familial dependence is found in human dignity with its basis in the desire of persons for mutual recognition. Negative freedom is only one of several ways to show respect for this dignity. The connections of the dignity of the aged with the values of autonomy, welfare and family membership are examined, and normative priorities among the three values are elaborated. Finally, the limits of moral reasoning about dependent aging are discussed and the religious implications of these limits are noted. |
