SOVIET IMAGE OF AND POLICY TOWARD CHINA: 1969-1979 (PERCEPTION)

This study attempts to contribute to a better understanding of Soviet policy toward China during the 1969-1979 period. It seeks to do so through a close examination of the policy itself as well as the totality of Soviet mental conceptions, i.e., "image," and then uses image as the central organizing concept to explain Soviet policy.;Soviet "image" was a mixture of a confident but cautious Brezhnevian self-image and unique Soviet emotions about China. The Soviets also viewed Chinese policies not as deviations from Marxism-Leninism, but as a direct result of Chinese nationalism. Maoists-qua-nationalists deformed China's infantile socialism and, with their anti-Soviet intention and great potential, threatened the USSR's ideals, interests and expectations of a new world order.;Part III of this study explains mainly the decision-making process of early 1969. The uncertainty among Soviet leaders and specialists about the situation in China as well as the tense atmosphere created by the March border clashes skewed Soviet perception and bounded Moscow's evaluation and selection of alternatives. This image which congealed in 1969 continued undiluted into the 1970s, precluding a more flexible approach to China.;Soviet China policy featured both "carrots" and "sticks." "Carrots" proved to be merely intermittent intitiatives with little imagination or innovation. "Sticks" demonstrated Moscow's intent to rely on pressure as the means, and containment as the mode, to deal with its "China problem." The year of 1969 marks the genesis of this new policy, from which no departures were made throughout the 1970s.