| Formal inquiries find that 80 percent of the accidents are the result of operator error. Critics of the "operator error" explanation pose suggest two other causal factors: negligent corporate risk-taking and system hazard. Corporations choosing to maximize profit at the expense of safety, create conditions under which accidents are inevitable. Impossible sailing schedules, staffing deficiencies, and insufficient equipment maintenance, are all profit-driven decisions made by shore-based management that directly affect the operating conditions onboard vessels. Where directly observable information is absent, the industry identifies open registration---otherwise known as flags of convenience---as indicative of negligent corporate risk-taking.; Alternatively, all accidents occur within a system or context. Included as key elements of this system are: registries, owners, port authorities, crews, insuring agencies, and international regulatory organizations. Inter-relationships among system components generate hazards within which individual vessels operate (Perrow, 1984). The central objective of this study was to determine which factor---negligent corporate risk-taking or system hazard---best accounts for passenger ship casualties.; The multi-source data collection process generated a worldwide sample of 532 events from 1950--1998. The data were subjected to Ordinary Least Squares regression for each of three outcome variables measuring event magnitude: seriousness of the casualty, percent surviving the event, and total human loss in death and injury. Separate regression estimates for each category within a number of ecological factors were generated to look for nesting or variation in effect: the type of vessel, time of day, nature of the event, and region. Additionally, regional regression estimates are compared with a geographic nearest-neighbor analysis, to examine the utility of cartographic analysis. Triangulating data sources and analytic strategies strengthens both the validity and reliability of the conclusions.; This study found that negligent corporate risk-taking had stronger effects than system hazard. However, the most important indicator of negligent corporate risk-taking---flags of convenience---was not shown to have a significant association with casualty magnitude. Three policy implications emerge from this work: (1) a range of strategies are necessary to ensure corporate compliance with international safety and shipping standards; (2) Port State Control programs should expand their policy of inspection to include all flags; and, (3) publicly available data that are independent of the corporation can overcome some methodological limitations of corporate crime research. |
