The politics of asymmetrical triangles: Cooperation and conflict in Northeast Asia

The purpose of this dissertation is to explore generalizable arguments on triangles that are composed of minor and major powers. I examine four asymmetrical triangles in Northeast Asia from 1954 to 1994. I assume that the structure of a triangle and the nature of relations in a dyad jointly determine the fate of triangular dynamics. First, comparing the South Korea-North Korea-Soviet Union triangle and the South Korea-North Korea-China triangle, I argue that adversarial engagement is associated with allied disputes and that reassurance and alternative security provisions play mediating roles. Second, comparing the North Korea-Soviet Union-China triangle and the South Korea-U.S.-Japan triangle, I expect to observe the following. (1) In a triangle in which two major powers provide security goods to a single minor power, conflict in a minor-major dyad is associated with enhanced cooperation in the other minor-major dyad. (2) In a triangle in which two minor powers receive security guarantees from a single major power, enhanced cooperation in a minor-major dyad is associated with an increase of cooperation in the minor-minor dyad. For an analysis of triangular permutations, I first (1) investigate longitudinal trends in event and trade data and then (2) conduct comparative case studies of the 1960s and 1990s. Both time series data and case studies confirm my hypotheses that triangular permutations are predicated upon state behavior, triangular structure and interstate relations.