Revising beliefs based in evidence versus affect: Effects on knowledge acquisition and conceptual change

Theoretical treatments on the issue of conceptual change have paid little attention to the distinction between acquiring knowledge that conflicts with prior beliefs and revising prior beliefs in light of that new knowledge. Models of conceptual change that fail to make the knowledge-belief distinction can produce faulty predictions and interpretations, and prevent us from discovering the factors that independently impact knowledge acquisition and belief revision.;Beliefs vary widely in whether they are based in coherence with known evidence and conceptual representations versus their promotion of affective values and goals. Study 1 provided empirical demonstrations of the prevalence of affect-based beliefs, the high degree of both between- and within-person variability in belief basis, and the validity of self-reports in assessing that variation. Study 2 supported present arguments about why the popular educational constructs of personal epistemology are not useful for understanding the evidence-affect basis of beliefs.;This variability in belief basis represents variability in the coherence and specificity of the conceptual structure underlying different beliefs. Thus, the effects of prior beliefs on knowledge acquisition and subsequent belief revision may depend upon the underlying evidence-affect basis of prior beliefs. Study 1 provided data suggesting that belief revision is a separate process and not a mere by-product of acquiring belief-conflicting knowledge, and that revision is less likely when prior beliefs are initially held for affective reasons. Study 3 supported current predictions that comprehension of belief-conflicting and belief-consistent information is better when prior beliefs are evidence- rather than affect-based. In addition, the comprehension of belief-conflicting and belief-consistent information was equivalent. The widespread, but previously untested, assumption that prior beliefs impede the learning of belief-conflicting information may result from the failure to distinguish between revising prior beliefs and the comprehension anomalous information.