Font Size: a A A

Comparisons of auction mechanisms in a multiple unit setting: A consideration for restructuring electric power markets

Posted on:2000-12-14Degree:Ph.DType:Dissertation
University:Cornell UniversityCandidate:Bernard, John CharlesFull Text:PDF
GTID:1462390014466282Subject:Economics
Abstract/Summary:
The objective of this study was to compare the performance of five single sided auctions that could be used in restructured electric power markets across different market sizes in a multiple unit setting. Auction selection would profoundly influence an industry over {dollar}200 billion in size in the United States, and the consequences of implementing an inappropriate mechanism would be great.; Experimental methods were selected to analyze the auctions. Two rounds of experiments were conducted, the first testing the sealed offer last accepted offer (LAO) and first rejected offer (FRO), and the clock English (ENG) and sealed offer English (SOE) in markets of sizes two and six. The FRO, SOE, and ENG used the same pricing rule. Second round testing was on the LAO, FRO, and the nonuniform price multiple unit Vickrey (MUV) in markets of sizes two, four, and six. Experiments lasted 23 and 75 periods for rounds 1 and 2 respectively.; Analysis of variance and contrast analysis were used to examine the data. The four performance measures used were price, efficiency, profits per unit, and supply revelation. Five basic principles were also assessed: no sales at losses, all low cost capacity should be offered and sold, no high cost capacity should sell, and the market should clear.; It was expected group size and auction type would affect performance. For all performance measures, group size was a significant variable, with smaller groups showing poorer performance. Auction type was significant only for the efficiency performance measure, where clock auctions outperformed the others. Clock auctions also proved superior for the first four principles.; The FRO performed poorly in almost all situations, and should not be a preferred mechanism in any market. The ENG was highly efficient, but expensive for the buyer. The SOE appeared superior to the FRO and ENG. The clock improves efficiency over the FRO while less information kept prices under the ENG.; The MUV was superior in revealing costs, but performed less well in other categories. While concerns existed for all the mechanisms investigated, the commonly proposed LAO was the best option for restructured electric power markets.
Keywords/Search Tags:Electric power, Auction, Markets, Multiple unit, Performance, FRO, LAO, ENG
Related items