| Chapter 1 elaborates the research interest and outlines the structure of the dissertation.; Chapter 2 defines the measure of international outsourcing and derives the determinants of outsourcing share from a simple model and applied them to empirical test. I found that low-wage location does not attract outsourced production necessarily, with wage effects acting differently for developing countries (DCs) and industrialized countries (ICs) across industries. Furthermore, IPP has exactly opposite effects for DCs and ICs. The result on distance indicates that the affiliates' export pattern follows the general export pattern of the host country. Additionally, increasing in R&D in the ICs attracts outsourcing; however, the R&D effect is mixed for different sectors for the DCs.; Chapter 3 sets up a partial equilibrium model to explain outsourcing and technology diffusion from the North to the South when the Southern Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) regime improves. For the South, if the technology diffusion spares more skilled worker from the domestic sector than the new demand created by the expansion of the multinational sector resulting from increased outsourcing, the Southern skilled wage decreases and the Southern skilled workers are relatively worse off than the unskilled workers; otherwise, the Southern skilled wage increases and the Southern skilled workers are relatively better off. For the North, both skilled and unskilled wage decrease and the skilled workers are relatively better off. In terms of welfare change, with the strengthened IPRs regime in the South, both the North and the South will be better off if the change in the critical value is small.; Chapter 4 simulates the effect of stronger IPRs protection on the price change, profit gain, and welfare loss, using the therapeutic group of Anti-ulcerative entities in China. This simulation result has some useful implications for the MNEs, the domestic producers, and the government.; Chapter 5 concludes. |
