Moving Targets: Dynamic Interaction in Market Contention

This dissertation explores the ways in which contentious social movements affect corporate social strategy. While prior research in this area has focused on the direct effects of social movements (i.e., can a movement elicit a concession to its demands from a corporate target?), this dissertation uncovers a more dynamic and generalized relationship between contentious activism and corporate social strategy. The first chapter provides evidence that companies targeted by boycotts tend to increase their pro-social claims in their press releases, suggesting that contentious attacks increase corporate attention to their social image among key constituencies. The second chapter explores a novel emerging phenomenon in non-market strategy wherein companies that are chronically targeted by social movements seek out alliances with contentious activists and co-sponsor boycotts. The chapter suggests that companies threatened by activism may try to ameliorate that threat by acting as activists themselves and allying with powerful non-government activist organizations. While the first two chapters explore corporate reactions to immediate activist threat, the final chapter uses a more holistic approach to explore longer-term trends toward corporate receptivity to social activists. In this chapter, I find that firms that are targeted by activist attacks tend to adopt what I call "social management devices," devices that are intended to help a firm attend to and manage potentially contentious social problems. Devices explored in this chapter include provision of an annual CSR disclosure, adoption of a CSR committee, and signing on to the UN charter for corporate social responsibility. Further, I find that these devices were each associated with increasing receptivity to social activist challenges, suggesting that they function as moderating mechanisms that link contentious interactions with increased corporate receptivity to social challenges.