| My dissertation strives to understand the conditions under which peace operations in intra-state wars succeed or fail. I address two main questions: What is peace operation success, and what contributes to such an outcome? I define the success of a peace operation based on two dimensions: a) the accomplishment of the peace operation's mandate, and b) the establishment of order. This definition allows me to avoid a binary framework of assessment in terms of success vs. failure by introducing intermediate categories: partial failure and partial success. To explain peace operations' outcomes, I look at the role of the type of strategy adopted and the type of intervener. I suggest that the three major ingredients of any strategy are: communication, capacity and knowledge. These ingredients all interact differently depending on which strategy is adopted. I apply my theoretical framework to empirical cases, testing the saliency of my postulates by examining11 peace operations in three countries: Somalia (1991-1995), Sierra Leone (1999-2005) and Liberia (1990-2009). I assess these operations' outcomes and the processes by which they succeeded/failed at accomplishing their mandate while simultaneously contributing/hindering their chances at re-establishing order. I argue that, for a peace operation in an intra-state war, the adoption of a deterrence strategy works best for re-establishing order while the involvement of a great power facilitates the accomplishment of the mandate. |
