| This study examines the military interventionary behavior of four democratic states---the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada---during the post-Cold War era. Using a data set created for the purposes of this examination, the variations in these states' interventionary behavior---concerning whether, why, and how they intervened in foreign conflicts---are established. Based on a model of conjunctional military interventionism, these differences are examined through the method of structured, focused case comparison for the Gulf War (1990--1991), Somalia (1992--1994), Bosnia (1992--1995), and Rwanda (1994). The elements of the model---identity, interests, and institutional dynamics---are examined for each of the democracies in the context of each case of conflict. Propositions and hypotheses derived from the model are evaluated throughout the examination and are found to be superior to traditional explanations of state behavior (i.e., realism and liberalism). It is argued that identity and interests provide analytical leverage over whether (and to some extent why) countries intervene, while institutional dynamics effectively explain why and especially how states go about using force. |
