Stepping back, muddling through or taking decisive steps: The power of international commitments and American humanitarian intervention in the post Cold War | Posted on:2005-06-30 | Degree:Ph.D | Type:Dissertation | University:University of California, Santa Barbara | Candidate:Cook, Christopher Robert | Full Text:PDF | GTID:1456390008981011 | Subject:Political science | Abstract/Summary: | PDF Full Text Request | What explains variation in American policy in humanitarian crises? Why do some complex emergencies receive the U.S. military, some receive only logistical help and others receives no aid at all? To answers these questions this study has employed a structured, focused comparison of nine competing hypotheses of foreign policy decision making drawn from the literature on realism, liberalism and inside-out theories of Congress, bureaucratic politics, public opinion, and the media. These hypotheses were then tested against eight carefully chosen cases of humanitarian crises in the post Cold War: Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, Rwanda, East Timor, The Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone. These cases provide variation in size, location and American policy chosen. Some cases saw the deployment of peacekeepers, others saw limited logistical aid and in one case (Rwanda) the U.S. did nothing at all.; This study contends that the puzzle of humanitarian intervention lies in the power of international organizations to set the policy agenda. Membership in international organizations (and the norms of membership that include duties, rules, and regulations) place issues on the American foreign policy agenda that might otherwise not have been there. Variation in policy stems from the level of commitments the US has to these multilateral organizations. The strength or robustness of these commitments are in turn dictated by the level of consensus present in the international community to solve the humanitarian problem. The stronger the consensus the more likely the U.S. will intervene and conversely the weaker the consensus and international commitments the greater likelihood of limited or non-intervention. Our other decision making hypotheses often have methodological flaws, poor predictive power and are often indeterminate, at best they remain necessary but not sufficient explanations to humanitarian policy. Madeline Albright once stated that the U.S. has three policy choices when facing humanitarian crises: Stepping back, muddling through, or taking decisive steps. This study has revealed that these options are in fact shaped by the international pressure from and the commitments we make and keep to multilateral organizations. | Keywords/Search Tags: | Humanitarian, International, Commitments, American, Policy, Power, Organizations | PDF Full Text Request | Related items |
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