Re-creating Adam: A philosophical investigation of the genetic engineering of human beings

It now seems possible, if not likely, that germ-line genetic engineering of human beings will become technologically possible at some time in the twenty-first century, raising a host of ethical and policy questions. This dissertation examines in some detail the capacity of each of three prominent approaches to philosophical ethics—utilitarianism, Kantianism, and virtue ethics—to provide guidance in individual ethical decision making and policymaking regarding genetic engineering. The author concludes that utilitarianism fails in its own project to vindicate universal benevolence and that its reductionist account of welfare maximization cannot capture important aspects of the good life or guide right action. Kantianism too is inadequate to the task: it fails in its project to vindicate respect for persons and its guidance cannot adequately address concrete problems under conditions of complexity. The author concludes that virtue ethics offers the best resources for individual decision making. The approach recommended by virtue ethics—acting from the virtues anchored in a conception of the good life—offers promise in helping us understand and cope with the complex questions raised by genetic engineering in a nuanced and context-sensitive way. The author concludes that an approach to policymaking that she labels “a navigational approach” offers promise for coping with the policy questions posed by genetic engineering, by allowing us to learn from one another as we debate across secular and religious communities with diverse perspectives on genetic engineering, and to consolidate our moral knowledge by our policymaking as we proceed.