Beyond Augustine: The ethical structure of community (John Rawls, Alasdair MacIntyre)

This dissertation attempts to find a middle ground between deontology and teleology, where accounts of both the right and the good as expressed in the virtues provide second order resources for an ethical system, but where the ultimate ground of ethics is divine-human community. The middle ground phenomenon affirms a realist account of the good in a way that Kant does not; likewise, it depends on commitments to values and personal relationships central to moral acts.; In the first chapter, I argue that John Rawls' justification pluralistic tolerance is unrealistic because, many religious communities ground moral judgment in the real and transcendent nature of God. Consequently, moral judgments derived from such comprehensive doctrines carry more weight morally than judgments that come from a social contract.; In chapter two, I argue that the dilemma Alasdair MacIntyre poses in After Virtue, points to virtues as substantial ethical resources but that an Augustinian tradition offers a viable alternative. Furthermore, because of Augustine's view of original sin and love, his ethic of love provides resources that MacIntyre's version of virtue ethics lacks.; In the third chapter, I outline Augustine's ethic of love along with the way he understands our participation in the Good. While much of Augustine's theory is convincing, it does not provide a suitable account of love for our neighbor. Augustine's uti/frui distinction undermines our love of a neighbor.; Finally, in the fourth chapter, I argue that the use-enjoyment distinction can be replaced by a distinction between love as care-giving and love as worship. Love is an attribute of human nature rather than a relationship between two beings. This understanding of love moves away from the context of Greek metaphysics toward the context of human nature as created in the image of God.