| This dissertation provides a new explanation for the European Union's ability to prevent ex post defection by its member states from undermining the provision of international public goods.; The current literature emphasises that the application of European Community law in national courts, following Community law's long-standing 'constitutional' doctrines of supremacy and direct effect, makes it impossible for member states to evade their obligations even when organised interests demand defection. Those national judges in turn, as well as transnational economic interests, have interest-based incentives to support the uniform application of European Community law. However, since EU obligations, including those relating to supremacy and direct effect, enter the national legal order only through national laws giving execution to the European treaties, national politicians retain the power to unilaterally restrict those enabling laws to limit the application of Community law, whether by statutes or constitutional amendments.; This dissertation builds on Olson's theory of collective action to provide an alternative explanation for the EU's ability to provide international public goods. Groups representing large cross-issue constituencies---encompassing groups---have incentives to accept costs in return for the provision of collective goods. Rational egoist states composed of large cross-issue governing coalitions have similar incentives to accept costs to support international public goods without hegemony or specific reciprocity.; A consideration of national jurisprudence in four EU member states (Germany, Ireland, Italy, and the United Kingdom) shows that none of these national legal orders had, by 2000, developed a jurisprudence which would apply European Community law if the national parliament explicitly legislated to restrict the national laws giving execution to the European treaties. The internal political organisation of these states can, however, be characterised as encompassing and a comparison of the EU's trade liberalisation with Eastern Europe through the Europe Agreements with the United States' trade liberalisation with Mexico through NAFTA demonstrates the comparatively limited opportunities for issue-based mobilisation by organised interests in the EU.; This dissertation demonstrates that Europe's constitutional order has required the encompassing internal political organisation of the EU member states as much as the supremacy and direct effect doctrines of European Community law. |
