| This dissertation concerns factors that influence accounting professors' formal enforcement of academic misconduct rules using the theory of planned behavior ("TPB") as a theoretical framework. The theory posits that intentional behavior, such as enforcement, can be predicted by peoples' perceived behavioral control and intention—which in turn can be explained by their attitudes, perceptions, beliefs, and background factors. This theoretical lens brings into focus possible interventions to promote enforcement—a much needed public good that is arguably underprovided on college campuses.;While formal enforcement against student cheating is relevant for all of academia, such enforcement is especially important in the discipline of accounting. Practically, accounting is not immune to the heightened levels of cheating that occur in schools of business—thus providing fertile ground for better understanding of enforcement. More urgently, accounting fundamentally concerns truth-telling to decision-makers; thus, dishonesty from accountants-in-training is arguably more egregious and worthy of faculty responses.;Three sets of models are presented—each containing a preliminary theoretical version before any modifications, a modified version, and a replication of the modified version. First, Model A explores enforcement behavior using a complete model of the TPB. Second, Model B more parsimoniously explores the effects of universities' administrative systems on enforcement. Finally, Model C attempts to improve the power of the TPB to explain planned behavior by including stimuli of such behavior—in the context of enforcement: Cheating Attitude, Cheating Norm Belief, and their interaction.;I used structural equation modeling to test the hypothesized relationships in the models. To measure the variables in the models, I emailed links for a web-based survey to 8,663 professors listed in the James R. Hasselback's Accounting Faculty Directory (electronic version as of March 1, 2009). Of the 1,503 responses (17.3%), 1,207 (13.9%) were complete and useable—sufficient to provide samples for both building and replicating models.;Overall, Model A highlights the importance of professors' Policy Knowledge and Control Beliefs in driving their Enforcement Attitude, and, ultimately, their willingness to enforce. Related differences-in-means testing between groups with extremely different knowledge concerning the elements of their schools' administrative systems supports the importance of policy knowledge. Also, Model B suggests that the extent to which a university's administrative system is like an honor code is of limited importance in enforcement; however, additional difference-in-means testing supports the value of honor codes over non-honor-code systems. Finally, Model C indicates immaterial explanatory improvement of the extension of the TPB—supporting the explanatory power of the original, more parsimonious theory.;KEYWORDS: accounting faculty, cheating, enforcement, deterrents, theory of planned behavior. |
