| How do negotiators react when the situation favors one side more than the other? Three laboratory studies examined the effects of negotiation structural asymmetries on perceived advantage, negotiator aspirations and yielding. In study 1, 40 undergraduate participants were asked to imagine that they, someone with whom they were negotiating or neither had access to inside information. Participants were also randomly assigned to one of two construal conditions (competitive vs. cooperative). When they imagined they had inside information participants reported greater perceived advantage than when they imagined others had inside information, regardless of whether they construed the negotiation as competitive or cooperative. However, only when they construed the negotiation as competitive did participants change first offers in response to asymmetry favorability. In study 2, 60 undergraduate participants were exposed to subjectively favorable, neutral and unfavorable levels of a different asymmetry---Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement (BATNA). Additionally, they were randomly assigned to one of two construal conditions (competitive vs. cooperative) and one of two knowledge-of-others'-preferences conditions (participant knew others' preferences or did not). Subjective favorability of BATNA, like inside information, affected perceived advantage regardless of construal or information about preferences. Whereas inside information asymmetries affected first offers when participants were unaware of others preferences, this did not occur in study 2. However, BATNA did affect participants' first offers and yielding when participants simultaneously were aware of others preferences and construed the task cooperatively. Finally, in study 3 158 participants were randomly assigned to either a favorable inside information or BATNA asymmetry---or a symmetric condition---to test directly whether different types of asymmetries (inside information and BATNA) only exert effects on perceived advantage, aspirations, and yielding when others' knowledge of the asymmetry is consistent with operation of that asymmetry. Effects on perceived advantage and aspirations were not statistically significant. Results indicated that when participants believed others were aware of their favorable asymmetry, BATNA exerted an effect on yielding, whereas when participants believed others were not aware of their favorable asymmetry, inside information affected yielding. The implications of the three studies for negotiation theory and research, as well as practice, are discussed. |
