| How do non-state actors fight and defeat foreign states in war? This dissertation is intended to solve this puzzle. I address this question from the perspective of what I call the sequencing theory. I argue that the answer to the puzzle rests with an orderly combination of several factors---state-building, popular support in guerrilla war, and modernization of armed forces. Through a properly-ordered sequence of multiple phases these non-state actors, such as insurgents and guerrillas broadly defined, increase their chance of victory. Survey of 85 cases of extra-systemic war in the period of 1816--1995 indicates three important trends. First, while non-state actors have won only at 21% overall, they have won at 70% in the last 70 years. Second, patterns of war have changed over time, along with the growing chance of victory for non-state actors. Finally, there are six such patterns, which have evolved in dissimilar trajectories and generated different degrees of success. I call them (1) conventional, (2) primitive, (3) degenerative, (4) premature, (5) Maoist, and (6) progressive models, each having the probability of victory at 15%, 13%, 0%, 0%, 80%, and 100%, respectively. While the first four models are linked with defeat, victory is associated with the last two models because they connote the very practice of evolution via three-stage sequences. Conversely, a number of non-state actors have fallen into either the conventional or primitive model, which explains the average low probability of their success. Extending the implications of this analysis to the ongoing war in Iraq, I argue that the current improvement in American-led military operations is consistent with what the degenerative model predicts; the transition of the Iraqi army into a band of insurgents who are likely to be eliminated by state forces. In fact, this dissertation predicts that, based on historically grounded evidence, the trend is likely to continue. |
