| The objective of this study is to address the puzzle of why states in the developing world with similar concerns and conditions have been slow to adopt transgenic (recombinant DNA, genetically modified/engineered) crop technologies, while others were pioneer users and developers of this technology. The central hypothesis tested here is that the type of involvement, defined as different strategies and access to institutional structures as well as varying organizational resources, of non-state actors (NSAs), both non-profit (non-governmental organizations, NGOs) and for-profit (industry), accounts for these differences. A second hypothesis is that variation in institutional context accounts for the differences in policies towards rDNA crops. Differences in institutional context include which level of government and type of institutions are responsible for policies for rDNA crops.; Both hypotheses are tested in three case study countries (Brazil, India and Argentina) at three levels of analysis: international, national/federal and sub-national (state and local). For each case country, the policy areas related to transgenic crops---intellectual property rights, trade, biosafety, food safety and consumer choice, and public research---are examined for the years 1996-2002.; The study reveals that in India and Brazil, NGO strategies were key, while in Argentina, industry actor access to the institutional structure was most important. This work also highlights the importance of the institutional context, which played a role in the policy differences in all three case studies. Centralization of policy-making tended to lead to more promotional policies for genetically modified crops, while the inclusion and counter-balancing of a wider set of actors (whether governmental or non-state actors) resulted in more precautionary policies. |
