| The post-Cold War era in U.S. foreign policy abounds with claims that so-called new or nontraditional issues represent threats to security, but how can one know when an issue has reached the point where it can he considered a security issue. This dissertation sought to understand under what conditions and to what extent the security label can lead an issue not traditionally categorized in the realm of security to become transformed into a security issue in U.S. foreign policy. In order to address these issues the dissertation specifically analyzed the securitization process of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in U.S. foreign policy asking to what extent HIV/AIDS was securitized and what, if any, were the impacts of securitization on U.S. policy. Furthermore, the dissertation was an attempt to validate and refine the criteria provided by Buzau, Waever and de Wilde in their securitization framework by applying the criteria empirically using HIV/AIDS in U.S. foreign policy as a case study. Through a method of interpretive policy analysis, the dissertation analyzed the language and policies in the U.S. regarding the HIV/AIDS pandemic from 1986 through the beginning of 2004. First, analyzing the framing of HIV/AIDS as a global issue in the U.S., the dissertation found that HIV/AIDS was framed as a health, development and security issue over the period of study. Second, through an application of the securitization framework the dissertation found that HIV/AIDS was partially securitized since the full sequence of securitizing moves, emergency actions and changes in inter-unit relations while present was weak. There were many attempts to securitize HIV/AIDS (securitizing moves) through the use of security language. However, there were fewer emergency actions and effects on inter-unit relations. Furthermore, the consequences of securitizing HIV/AIDS were modest. The dissertation validated the criteria of the securitization framework, but also suggested some refinements to the framework in the context of the U.S. policy process. |
