| Under the "double squeeze" of advanced technology in developed countries and low cost in developing countries,increasing corporate R&D investment to enhance their independent innovation capabilities is extremely important for the survival and sustainable development of enterprises and the smooth implementation of national innovation-driven development strategies.Considering the key role of CEO in strategy formulation and innovation decisionmaking,the impact of their personal characteristics on corporate R&D investment has become an important topic for scholars.The previous research was based on the Upper Echelon Theory,and discussed the relationship between CEO background characteristics and corporate R&D investment in terms of gender,age,education,and professional experience.However,research on the impact of CEO power on corporate R&D investment is very limited.Aware of the lack of research in this area,more and more scholars have begun to explore the relationship between CEO power and corporate R&D investment,and have drawn many inspiring and influential conclusions.However,there are some differences in the conclusions of these studies.This paper believes that the main reasons for these differences are the following three aspects:(1)In previous studies,when discussing the impact of CEO power on corporate R&D investment,they often only emphasized the one-sided risk aversion or risk pursuit effect of CEO power,without comprehensively considered the two different risk preference effects and resource guarantee effects generated by power.(2)Previous studies have ignored the heterogeneity of CEO power.Power is a comprehensive and complex concept.For different types of CEO power,it often contains different connotations,and may have a differential impact on corporate R&D investment.(3)Previous studies have ignored specific stages of the firm life cycle.For companies at different stages,due to differences in operating environments and innovation strategies,they often face with different potential risks and resource requirements,which may affect the risk preference effect and resource guarantee effect of CEO power.Finally,the relationship between CEO power and corporate R&D investment will evolve dynamically with the development of the firm life cycle.Based on the above analysis,this paper first tests the overall impact of CEO totle power on corporate R&D investment.Then,it discusses the differential impact of CEO heterogeneous powers on corporate R&D inmestment,such as structure power,ownership power,expert power and prestige power.Next,this paper discusses the dynamic characteristics of CEO’s totle and heterogeneous powers influencing corporate R&D investment when the firm is in different stages of life cycle.At last,based on the empirical analysis results,this paper also carried out further research on the effect of CEO power on R&D investment.On the one hand,it examines the joint influence of CEO heterogeneous power on R&D investment from the perspective of the internal structure.On the other hand,it examines the moderating effect of the board size and institutional investor shareholding on the effect of CEO power on R&D investment from the perspective of governance environment.After completing the theoretical analysis and research hypothesis,this paper selected 2007-2018 China Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies of high-tech industry as the research sample.the main research conclusions are as follows:(1)Overall,CEO totle power has a significant positive impact on corporate R&D investment.(2)From the perspective of heterogeneity,CEO heterogeneous power have a differentiated impact on corporate R&D investment.Specifically,CEO structural power has a significant negative impact on corporate R&D investment;while CEO ownership power,expert power and prestige power have a significant positive impact on corporate R&D investment.(3)When a firm is in different stages of its life cycle,the effect of CEO power on corporate R&D investment shows a dynamic evolution.First of all,the positive impact of CEO totle power on corporate R&D investment only exists significantly in the growth stage and decline stage,but not in the maturity stage.Then,from the perspective of heterogeneous power,the negative impact of CEO structural power on corporate R&D investment only exists significantly in the maturity stage;The positive impact of CEO ownership power on corporate R&D investment only exists significantly during the growth stage;The positive impact of CEO expert power on corporate R&D investment is exists significantly during the maturity stage and the decline stage;The positive impact of CEO prestige power on corporate R&D investment is exists significantly during the growth stage and the maturity stage.(4)Further research also found: For firms in the growth stage,CEO structural power and institutional investor shareholding(or board size)will strengthen(or weaken)the positive impact of CEO ownership power on R&D investment,institutional investor shareholding will weaken the positive impact of CEO prestige power on R&D investment,CEO ownership power and prestige power can generate synergy effects that mutually promote R&D investment;For firms in the maturity stage,institutional investor shareholding can help weaken the negative impact of CEO structural power on R&D investment;For firms in decline stage,CEO ownership power will weaken the positive impact of expert power on R&D investment,while board size will help strengthen this positive impact of expert power.This paper considers the heterogeneity of power and the dynamic development of the firm at the same time,comprehensively and deeply discusses the effect of CEO power on corporate R&D investment.In the context of China’s macro-institutional system that promotes innovation-driven and industrial transformation and upgrading,In order to improve the level of corporate R&D investment and their independent innovation capabilities,The conclusions of this paper provide policy implications for the optimization and dynamic adjustment of CEO power structure. |
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