Study On The Local Government Behavior Of Industrial Land Supply And Its Impact

As to the problem of lack of efficiency and imbalance of economic structure in the situation of new economic norm,president Xi stressed that China should strengthen structural reform of the supply front.And the structural reform of the supply front has a strong pertinence and guiding significance in solving the problems of low efficiency,improper allocation of resources,slow technological progress and lack of innovative ability in the current production.Among them,the main battlefield of supply side reform is factor market reform.As a basic factor of production,land supply and use efficiency have an important influence on the overall efficiency of the economy.The general direction of the reform of the land system over the past thirty years is market-oriented,but most of the previous reforms have been to strengthen demand side competition.Although a certain market supply has been achieved,but the local government is still the only supply entity in the primary market of the land.The supply of land diversification has not yet started completely,and the reform of the supply side of the land market still needs to be strengthened.The local government' s monopoly on the supply of land market will naturally influence all aspects of China's economic system.In view of this,this study investigates the market structure and allocative efficiency of industrial land supply.Based on the analysis of market structural characteristics and institutional causes of industrial land supply,focusing on the local government behavior,land supply market level and allocation efficiency,to explore the economic performance of the current land supply system,and to provide theoretical guidance and practical guidance for further promoting the marketization of land factor.This research is divided into nine chapters and composed of three parts:basic construction(Chapter 1 to Chapter 3),analysis of problems(Chapter 4 to Chapter 7)and probe into the reform path(Chapter 8 to Chapter 9).The first part includes the first three chapters,aiming at constructing working foundation of this research.The chapter 1 describes the research background and illustrates the significance of the research.This chapter shows that lack of land use efficiency caused by land market distortion and enterprise land cost burden heavier are existed simultaneously in China.Through the study of local government monopoly land supply behavior and land allocation efficiency,it helps to understand the causes of this phenomenon,and to provide theoretical guidance and practical guidance for further promoting the marketization of land factor.The chapter 2 makes a systematic review,summary and induction of the relevant literature,thus grasping the relevant research trends and laying the foundation for the development of this research.Through literature review,pointed out the need to combine the existing land supply system,land market structure and the competition of local government,land transfer behavior and the analysis performance associated with the expansion of existing research,for the current China industrial land supply market reform to provide clues.The chapter 3,based on the first two chapters,further summarizes and defines the relevant theories and concepts.At the same time,the framework of this study is constructed in this chapter.The second part includes chapter 4-7.The purpose of this part is to analyze the behavior characteristics of local government under the monopoly supply of industrial land and its influence.The chapter 4 first reviews the process of land supply system reform since the founding of the People's Republic of China,and then proves the internal logic of the current industrial land supply system change.Secondly,this chapter analyzes the system restriction faced by the market-oriented reform of industrial land supply,so as to illustrate the difficulties existing in the reform of the current industrial land supply system.At last,this chapter analyzes the characteristics of the supply of industrial land under the restriction of the existing system,and then illustrates the problems existing in the local government's monopoly of land supply.This chapter divides the process of China's industrial land supply system change into three stages,and points out the dynamic mechanism of the industrial land supply system changes in different stages of development.This chapter also shows that the industrial land market reform along the two directions,one is to regulate behavior of local government land supply,the other is to integrate urban and rural land market.And the lagging land system foundation,the disordered local government competition and the unsmooth land management system restrict the market level of industrial land supply.Under the existing system constraints,the current industrial land supply market showed three distinct characteristics:first,in the land expropriation system,local government land acquisition costs are "soft constraints";second,the local government regards land supply as a policy tool;third,because of local development competition combined with the fixity of land position,land market competition has obvious regionality and stage.In the chapter 5,the current situation of industrial land supply is analyzed by using the data of 2003-2013 industrial land transfer.Statistical results show that,with the improvement of policies and regulations,the supply mode of industrial land presents a phased change,and the proportion of "inviting,filming and hanging" increases year by year.And the price level of industrial land is different in different regions and different modes of transfer,and with the change of policy,it shows a trend of increasing.The industrial land supply changes with the industrialization development.In the industrialization period,the price gap of industrial land is small,and the proportion of landt "inviting,filming and hanging" is low,and the scale of industrial land supply increases with the industrialization level.Secondly,based on the research of the current situation of industrial land supply,this chapter deeply explores the influence of local government economic behavior on industrial land price under different levels of industrialization development.The results show that,there are different impacts of local government economic behavior on industrial land in different industrialization stage.In the early stage of industrialization,the influence of local government economic behavior on industrial land price is suppressed,and with the progress of industrialization,the rising effect of local government economic behavior on industrial land price gradually appears.Finally,this chapter analyzes the social welfare effects of local government's monopoly on land supply.On the one hand,owing to local governments obtain high land prices through monopoly power,the shortage of land supply be caused which lead to the deadweight loss of social welfare;on the other hand,the local government' attracting investment competition will lead to a large number of land supply and lower land prices,which lead to the form of price subsidies "prisoner dilemma",thus affecting the efficiency of land allocation.The chapter 6 probes into the influence of land price change and local government land supply behavior on industrial transfer.The results show that the rising cost of industrial land can contribute to the industrial transfer,while non market-oriented land leasing practiced by local governments will impede the formation of reasonable price gradient of industrial land.With regard to the regional disparity,this paper finds that there is a general trend of industrial transfer in China which is shown that the industries is gradually transferring from the eastern China to the central and eastern China.Based on the above analysis,this chapter further discusses the negative effects of industrial transfer caused by land price change.And points out that the monopoly supply of industrial land of local government leads to the deviate between land transaction price and market equilibrium price,resulting in land allocation efficiency decline.Therefore,at present,China still needs to further promote the market level of industrial land supply and optimize the allocation of land resources.The chapter 7 focuses on the problem of excessive supply of industrial land which resulting in inefficient allocation of land,and then analyses the industrial supply market level and land allocation efficiency in China cities.The result shows that:The local government has the intrinsic motive to expand the scale of industrial land supply,which prompts local government over supply of land and distorts land prices,leading to lower level of marketization of industrial land.And the marketization level of industrial land supply is an important factor affecting the efficiency of industrial land allocation.Industrial land supply market level is an important factor influencing the efficiency of the allocation of industrial land,the lower the market level of industrial land supply,the more distorted the price of industrial land,the more prominent the mismatch of land factors.This chapter reveals such a practical dilemma:the local government in the development competition lacks the inner driving force to narrow the land supply.The reason is that the local government will over supply of land to maximize the output and thus gain more control over the land factors.But with more investment in terms of land output,bigger deviate from the market demand,decreasing the efficiency of land use.Finally,the third part includes the contents of the chapter 8 and the chapter 9.Based on the foregoing analysis,this part discusses and explores the marketization of industrial land supply,and finally gives the relevant policy recommendations.The chapter 8 discusses the achievements and the existing problems of the reform which is in order to regulate the behavior of local government for land supply.This chapter takes the collective construction land entering the market as a way of industrial land supply system innovation,to explore the core logic of collective construction land entering the market and its influence on the current land supply system,and uses the method of case analysis on Wujin reform practice to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of the existing reform.It is pointed out that the emergence of potential benefits,consolidation of land system and institutional competition promote land system innovation.The re orientation of the land market subject,the re construction of interaction mechanism between land price and supply and demand,and the re equilibrium of land property right system and regulation system are the influence of the collective construction land entering the market to the land market.The reform practice of Wujin through the policy constraints,to achieve the true sense of the collective land and state-owned land have same right and price,taken a firm step for China land market reform.But in the reform practice,the local government still plays an important role in the market transaction process,framers' market position is not prominent,local government may hinder the cultivation and growth of farmers' market players.The chapter 9 summarizes above,and combines with the short-term needs of the current situation and the direction of long-term institutional reform,puts forward the following three specific policy recommendations to improves the market level of industrial land supply:(1)to regulate the local government land transfer behavior;(2)to transform the local government functions;(3)to promote the reform of the legal system of land supply.