Research On Dynamic Evolution Mechanism Of Cluster Dominated Enterprise Innovation Competition Based On Bounded Rationality

With the rapid development of economy,competition of nations and regions has become increasingly intense,and enterprise clusters have become a porpular economic phenomenon,receiving considerable attention.Now,national government has regarded this normal as the important access and political tool to contribute to economic development,and academic circles has taken it to be a hot research topic as well.Enterprise clusters refers to a large number of interconnected enterprises geographically concentrated in a broad sense,emphasizes the configuration form,operational association and internal mechanism inside the co-opetition of different enterprises.In fact,all the activities conducted among enterprises related to technological innovation,without which no one could survive in the highly competitive market.Many researchers have realized the significant impact of innovation on the development of enterprise clusters,and vigorously encouraging firms carry out activities of innovation to enhance the technology levels.Meanwhile,as the visible hand,government plays a vital role in the technological innovation of cluster.However,with the in-depth study,many research findings based on the traditional rational assumptions have proved to be failed on practical application,and some of them have even come out to be contrary to expectation.These signs that faced with the complicated market environment in reality,decision makers are subject to many influence factors,such as psychological bias,cognitive bias,computing ability,incomplete information and so on,so that unable to make completely rational decisions,although no one can deny that the hypothesis of economic man is the basis of microeconomics and the foundation of game theory.Hence,it is reasonable to say,most enterprise managers make decisions with bonded rationality.Therefore,based on bonded rationality hypothesis,this paper establishes three types of dynamic game model in three different competition stages,namely innovation decision making,R&D investment and quantity competition,combined with the evolutionary game theory and nonlinear dynamic system theory,aiming at analyzing the evolutionary performances of oligopolies with bonded rationality in game stages.At the end,conclusions and implications of practical economic significance are drawn from the research above.The main research work and findings are summarized as follows:In the stage of technology innovation decision-making,this paper introduced the concept of “technology potential difference,and analyzed the significant influence of potential difference ? Tech-innovation spillover and innovation efficiency on the strategies selection of cluster enterprises with potential difference from views of static game and dynamic game separately.In addition,the factors caused market failures of innovation were explored and the effective solutions to encourage innovation among cluster enterprises were pursued.The study found that the motivation of leader firms for innovative activities has positive relationship with potential difference and negative relationship with knowledge spillover,while SMEs are just the opposite.And enterprise innovation efficiency coefficient shows complexity of the innovation game more directly.In the end,this paper offered reasonable suggestions on policy to optimize the game result,aiming to provide theoretical reference to decision-makers and regulators.In the stage of R&D investment,this paper created a dynamic model of R&D competition with government R&D subsidy,which is based on classic duopoly games and branch theory of dynamic system and chaos economics principle,and analyzed the effects of R&D subsidy on the R&D competition's Nash equilibrium and the whole market operation.Also,numerical simulation was carried out followed.Research shows that: 1)Appropriate subsidy rates is largely limited by market demand function? adjustment speed of R&D investment and product costs.Keeping R&D subsidy rates within certain range helps system maintain equilibrium states.In other words,bifurcation or chaos could happen if R&D subsidy coefficient fall out of range.2)In the early stage of the subsidy policy,the market could be in a short unstable state,within which period the fluctuation range of the R&D investment is larger than that of the profit margin,and both of them have positive relationship with government R&D subsidy rates.3)Public R&D subsidies encourage corporates increase R&D investment and enable the corporate with faster adjustment speed to obtain higher return in dynamic duopoly games.At last suggestions of subsidy strategies for corporates and governments are given to provide reference for the relevant R&D subsidy policy making.In the stage of quantity competition,this paper constructed dynamic models of multi-oligopolies game with different levels of rationality on quantity competition,which is considering the bounded rationality of dominant enterprises in cluster.View from the enterprise with median level rationality,complex system theory was applied to research characters of dynamic model,such as stability,bifurcation and chaos.Also,the influence of quantity adjust parameter on dynamic evolution process and competition was analyzed in the next.The study shows: Demand function,marginal cost and the production adjustment coefficient of the GD firm determine the dynamic evolution trajectory and the final state.The lower adjustment speed is helpful for the system to reach the Nash equilibrium earlier and then keep stable at equilibrium condition.In the contrary,the market system possibly enter into chaos with unreasonable marginal cost or overhigh adjustment speed.When the system enters into chaos state,Pyragas delay feedback control method works to stabilize on the quantity Nash equilibrium.