| As a kind of trading mechanism that reflects fairness,openness and competition in the market,bidding can maximize the optimal allocation of resources,and has gradually become the most commonly used trading method in the procurement field of various industries and departments in China.In particular,it is the legal transaction method for government procurement of standardized commodity(such as goods)and non-standardized commodity(such as engineering and services).However,in the practice of bidding,the problems of the"reverse selection" of the procurement department,the "moral hazard" of the bidders,and the proliferation of rent-seeking behaviors between the two sides are extremely prominent.In fact,the essence of these problems lies in the asymmetry between the buyer and the seller regarding the true cost information of the target.The government and the regulatory authorities cannot formulate appropriate procurement bidding rules with reliable cost information,resulting in social welfare losses.The bidding structure econometric model is the most important empirical model in the field of auction experience research.Revealing the bidder’s private cost information from the actual bidding data is its main research goal,that is,to estimate the bidder’s private cost distribution F(c).In fact,F(c)reveals the potential supply characteristics of the seller’s market.Knowing the potential supply characteristics can help to guide the practice to design the optimal bidding mechanism,so as to obtain high-quality goods or-services at low prices.Therefore,how to identify and est:imate the private cost distribution of bidders from the actual bidding data is always a hot spot in the research field of bidding experience.However,the empirical research based on the auction/bidding structural econometric model started late in China.Most of the research which still focuses on the analysis of bidding mechanism or the simulation experiment of equilibrium strategy is lacking the statistical inference and analysis of the generation mechanism of actual data.The main reason is that the disclosure of bidding data in China is special.Researchers often can only observe the final transaction price and cannot observe all offers of each bidder,which makes the existing empirical research methods have certain limitations when directly applied to the research of practical problems in China.In addition,there are many differences between homogeneous standardized commodities and heterogeneous differentiated commodities in the practice of government procurement bidding.Therefore,in order to deeply explore the economic mechanism of the two types of bidding activities,reveal the potential supply structure characteristics of each type of target market,try to guide the practice to optimize the corresponding procurement bidding rules to improve the resource allocation efficiency of government procurement bidding.This paper combines the different attributes(homogeneity and heterogeneity)of the target with the actual characteristics of the data structure of China’s bidding(only the transaction can be observed)Based on the previous research results,the following four aspects are studied:First,in view of the fact that the theory of the auction/bidding structural econometric analysis method and its application started late in China,this paper combs and summarizes the relevant literature according to the research process of the auction structural econometric model.In addition,since the bidding is usually regarded as an extension of the first price sealed auction,in order to facilitate the latter’s relevant research conclusions directly applied to the research of bidding activities,this paper also combs and summarizes the dual relationship between them.Subsequently,several important estimation methods in the auction structural econometric model are paired to the bidding structural econometric modelSecondly,in order to reveal the pricing mechanism of the government’s procurement and estimate the potential supply structure of homogeneous standardized commodities-the private cost distribution of bidders,and in view of the incompleteness of the data structure of China’s bidding(only the transaction is observable),this paper establishes a structural bidding econometric model only with observable transaction price,and conducts game equilibrium analysis.Based on the theory of minimum value distribution,Guerre,et al(2000)’s indirect nonparametric identification and estimation framework is extended.Further,the above identification and estimation framework is extended to a homogenous bidding structural econometric model with a reserve price.Third,In order to reveal the pricing mechanism of the government-sponsored heterogeneous differentiated commodity and estimate the potential supply structure of the market that estimates the differentiated target-the conditional cost distribution of the bidder,this paper further relaxes the homogeneity hypothesis of the target,allowing multiple heterogeneity of the target.Moreover,based on the heterogeneity of the target and the transaction price data,establishes a heterogeneous bidding structural econometric model and conducts game equilibrium analysis.In view of the only observable transaction price data and the non-parametric kernel smoothing dimension catastrophe problem,this paper is based on the asymptotic distribution theory of the minimum value order statistic,assuming that the bid winner’s quotation and its cost obey the type III extreme value distribution(also known as Weibull type distribution),and using the maximum likelihood estimation method for parameter inference,and use the minimum value distribution theory to have a indirectly inferring of the bidder’s conditional cost distribution.Further,the above identification and estimation framework is extended to the heterogeneous bidding structural econometric model with the reserve price.Fourth,in order to improve the fairness and efficiency of the government’s purchase of homogenous standardized machinery and heterogeneous differentiated public service bidding activities,this paper takes the central procurement printer and the Beijing procurement street cleaning service as examples to establish empirical analysis of the bidding structural econometric model.The main research findings:In the bidding for the purchase of printers by the central enterprise,the current government procurement rules have effectively reduced the procurement cost.However,for commodities with higher additional costs,the bidders have a cost transfer behavior;the value of the goods and its supply elasticity show the same direction of change.Moreover,when the government purchases goods with less value,the limit price policy is effective;when the government purchases goods with large value,the subsidy policy is effective.In the bidding for the procurement of street cleaning services in Beijing,when there are many potential bidders,the bidder can adopt a strategy of lowering the reserve price to increase the expected return at the lower bidding efficiency loss;When the heterogeneity of the public service target increases and the bidder needs to bear more supply costs,the bidder should increase the reserve price to ensure the bidding efficiency;When the target market faces a large cost entry barrier,a high reserve price strategy should be adopted to reduce the expected return and to ensure the efficiency of the bidding. |
