Risk Sharing And Profit Distribution Of PPP Project From The Perspective Of Government

Under the circumstance of new urbanization,the government clearly advocates the Public-Private-Partnership(PPP)which involves the cooperation of the government and the social capital in China.The core of implementing the PPP proves to be “share the risk,share the benefit”.PPP serves to broaden the financing channels and alleviate the financial pressure.It stimulates the private sector to control costs and spreads the risks of building and operating,by putting up the market-oriented subsidy mechanism.Moreover,PPP restricts the government and private sectors with the franchise agreements,so as to promote the transformation of government functions.This research contriburtes in the following issues:(1)The dissertation analyzes the inherent logic of PPP in theory.From the perspective of the government,we illustrate the PPP's logical relation and economic efficiency,along with proving its practicability.The analysis of logical relation and economic efficiency shows that PPP has a distinct logical relation with a considerable efficiency and the project participants of PPP shares an equilibrium mechanism.(2)Based on the practicability of PPP,the dissertation explores the risk-sharing subjects.Taking the public project of National Economic and Technical Development Zone,Qujing City,Yunnan Province as an example,we first recognize the risks and establish the risk set.Second,we utilize the Entropy Method and Topsis Method to determine the weights of risk indices and the prime risk-sharing subjects.From the perspectives of risk tolerance,profit ability and risk response capability,we list the risk-sharing subjects as the government,the construction contractor,the investors,the operator and the financial institution,whose risk degrees rank from high to low.This order could serve as the indicator when it comes to the division of risks rewarding.Third,based on the risk sharing of PPP,we analyze the distribution of profits.After theoretically exploring the PPP's principle of profit and the game theory between the public and private sectors,we establish the game model and attain the Shapley value of PPP profit,with the assistance of the risk-sharing capability indices.Finally,we define the profit distribution of PPP respectively in the condition that involves the financial institutions or not.(3)Focusing on the probable moral hazard,we simulate the effect of government regulation in this dssertaion.Using this method,we establish the moral hazard model and empirically analyze the correlation of risk aversion,the capability,the stability of external factors and the government's incentives.The survey proves that the private sectors' behavior of risk aversion shows a diminishing marginal utility with the governments' incentives.In a low level of avoiding the risk,the private sector's capability change exerts a great impact on the governments' incentive index.The government apparently needs to improve their incentives to ensure a preferable effect of PPP.This dissertation,from the perspective of government,with theoretically interpretation and model simulation,probes the pattern of risk sharing and profit distribution.The conclusions are of great assistance for the government to design a reasonable risk aversion and profit distribution mechanism.Besides,the conclusions help to avoid the moral hazard,improve the overall benefit of the PPP,and meanwhile offer new perspectives and methods for PPP studies.