The Hyper-market Contract Between Buyer Monopoly And Seller Oligopoly

This thesis analyses market structure of the monopsony and the oligopoly.And based on the discussing the competitive advantage of the upstream and downstream enterprises and contract relations,to explore that the hyper-market contract is the optimal choice of both the demand-side and supply-side.Moreover,the thesis analyses the self-enforcing of hyper-market,combined with the opportunism induced by the specific investments and discusses the motivation of bidding and the corporation’s behavior guidelines.And the thesis interprets from the perspective of path dependence that the hyper-market contract is steady.Firstly,the thesis reviews the literature of monopsony theory and supply oligarchs theory,pointed out that the hyper-market contract is an intermediate state of the corporate network and the market.It is a special category of relational contract.A common feature of various forms of enterprise networks is mainly depend on the relational contract to join the various members of the enterprise,but the type and nature of a variety of relational contracts differ.The nature of the hyper-market contract has a key resource in the value chain or industry enterprises,to exercise control and command of the right to conduct transactions with other companies.The exchange features of such transactions between enterprises are brand-new,the whole process along with the production process step by step to enrich and expand the product to be traded both sides of multiple composite outcome of a transaction.On the basis of literature review,the thesis introduct a contract between monopsony and the oligopoly to analyze the market structure of China’s relay protection industry.On the one hand,the natural and administrative monopoly of the national grid led to the formation of monopsony,on the other hand,there is higher seller barriers to entry in the relay protection industry.In such a market structure with the hyper-market contract which has long-term stable and harmonious and cooperative relations between upstream and downstream,it is to make a unique restrict and banlance between buyer and seller.With path dependence and repeated Games,flexible network organization can be overcome the opportunistic behavior,promote the overall interests,share information,reduce uncertainty and take advantage of the counterparty resources(including knowledge resources)to extend the boundary of their own ability.These will greatly promote the creation of the organizational rent and transaction cost savings.Natural monopoly industry always has high degree of asset specificity.Asset specificity does not always lead to a rip-off,depending on the specific game environment.With the mode of super-market contract,the two sides remain the market contractual relationship,but this contractual relationship has the characteristics of long-term stable and mutually beneficial cooperation and stable in the industry of high asset specificity.Under the conditions of self-implementation,the relationship-specific investment has become an important exogenous variable to explain the hyper market contracts and production organization.Hyper market contracts not only can satisfy the requirement of investment side and protect the relationship-specific investments but also has a unique mechanism to enhance the value of trading relationships,and strengthen commitment to further promote the trading of both relationship-specific investments.Relationship-specific investment has commitment effect.In a certain economic environment,the hyper market contract may spirit up the transactions to make an additional investment of the relationship-specific investments.Bidding procurement method in the procedure of electrical equipment procurement meets to the requirements of the large-scale socialized production and the development of market economy.It is an effective form to achieve the rational allocation of social resources.Once monopsony and supply oligopoly market structure come into being,the hyper-market contract can contribute to the bidding of the transaction costs minimized,and at the same time,in the long-term cooperation,such the market equilibrium can be maintained stability long-termly.Relay protection equipment manufacturers are interdependence with each other in the vertical relationship of the industrial chain.It is apparently stable implementation of the contract and to enhance the efficiency of the transaction to achieve long-term good income,and thus naturally reach the hyper-market contract,which is a good complement to the the bidding and is the result of multiple equilibria in the path dependence of the system game.In a particular market structure,the oligopsonist comes to the fore between administrative monopoly and competition.In such a market structure,the hyper-market contract is undoubtedly the optimal choice of a contract.The typical industry’s specific financial data prove that the hyper-market contracts in the Chinese relay protection market are efficient.It can be found that four typical enterprise of the security industry’s net profit margin is considerable.But the week system and lack of fair contract will bring a lot of inefficiencies,only by continuously adjusting the contract model design,it can be improved the welfare loss of monopoly or administrative monopoly and improved the efficiency of the hyper-market contract.The stability of the hyper-market contracts come true through accommodating the external factors and control the internal factors.The target of the hyper-market contracts is to increase the interests of all parties,and improve individual and global competitiveness.But it is inherent instable because of internal and external factors which influence the members’ cooperation efficiency.Internal factors affecting the stability of hyper-market contract mainly are caused by dissatisfaction with their own interests and leave the threat posed to the stability of the entire supply chain alliance,external factors are mainly from the external environment changes and other supply chain impact of competition on the supply chain alliance.When the administrative functions of the power industry administrative monopoly still exists in China,the stability of the hyper-market contract is in fact very difficult to maintain.