Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance And Reform Of State-owned Enterprises

Combining with the corporate governance theory and achievements of research,this paper briefly introduced the progress of governance research in westerndeveloped nation. Based on the resources and theory, this paper use the samples basedon Shanghai and Shenzhen exchange listed companies in2010(eliminate ST and PT,financial insurance and the income of zero of the company) and those samples in past10years of data from the ownership structure，the equity concentration ratio, and thecapital structure, managers market, compensation contracts and agency cost of thecorporate governance performance of dimension research, using of institutionaleconomics, information economics, corporate governance e theory and relatedeconomic theory, the method combined with theory and practice, descriptive statisticsby the governance data of listed company from twelve industry, using the variablesof EVIEWS panel data model, and the research on equity (ROE), total return onassets (ROA), returns on Sales (ROS), net income (NI), unit staff turnover, Sales ofassets, unit staff assets, and the equity concentration ratio (OWNER), actualcontroller in nature (SOE), the company scale (SIZE), fixed assets ratio (TANG),intangible assets ratio (INTG), income GROWTH rate (GROWTH), employeeexpenses (PAYSTAFF), Sales revenue per unit of assets, executive pay (CEOPAY),the company set up time (FIRMAGE) and the relationship of corporate governanceperformance (profitability PR) between with those variables.The whole paper consists of introduction, main body which has six chapters andconclusion. There are three parts for research distribute in the content.The first part and second cheaper describe mainly in the different system ofownership of the governance of listed company performance and enterprise growthequity structure, capital structure, and the equity concentration ratio, cost of agencyproblems, and review and summarizes related companies about the research progressof the management of the domestic and foreign relevant problems, the researchresults and the present situation; At the same time, clarifying the significant of practice about studying the problem of theory, indenting the space of forwardstudying the problem, the probability of innovative points and difficulty, and thenpoint out the basic thought of the studying the problem, framework, and method etc.The second part, including3,4,5,6chapters, is the main trunk of full text andthe supporting of the theoretical basis. It is trying to clarify the relationship amongcorporate governance, the equity concentration ratio, capital structure and agency costand comprehensive corporate governance performance under different ownershipwhich include its theory basis and practice analysis, trying to redesign, reconstructednew comprehensive performance evaluation system, the comprehensive evaluation ofthe existing in the economic role of state-owned enterprises, promoting the newstainable profitable model of listed company etc.The third part, including chapter7, which is based on the theory of the researchhypotheses, design and model, descriptive analysis, panel data regression analysis andthe basis of empirical test, proposed the suggestions and countermeasures ofstate-owned enterprise reform, and summarize the sustainable development (profitratio) of corporate governance theory research and look into future practice.Through above theoretical researching and practical analysis, we conclude andsuggest as follows:Firstly, Analyzing state-owned, mixed and private companies in2010from twoaspects: corporate governance performance and social welfare, we found that mainbusinesses of stated owned enterprises are excavation industry, electric power, gas,water, transportation, storage etc.; main business of non stated-owned enterprises aremanufacturing, information technology industry, animal husbandry and fishery. Insocial welfare indicators, stated-owned enterprises have exceeded private company inmost industries. That means stated-owned enterprises are more focused on socialwelfare and responsibility. Through OLS regression, SALES, ASSETS andMARKET SHARE of stated owned enterprises are higher than private company; ifmeasuring the company’s performance by profitability, profitability of privatecompany is better than stated-owned and mixed company. That means privatecompany is more focused on earning.Secondly, According to stable samples of2002-2010listed companies, the company with50%equity concentration has the largest proportion; and results ofsignificance test shows that the performance of company with30-50%equityconcentration is the best, and company with the lowest equity concentration has aworst performance. Results of significance test of adjusted sample shows that theperformance of company with a highest equity concentration is the worst, and theperformance of company with a highest degree of equity separation. There is asignificant deference between the company with the highest equity concentration andanother two. We found the deference may not caused by ownership structure. Ourcompany’s ownership structure increasingly seem to has a high equity concentration,especially the stated-owned enterprises which are not efficient and have no the mosteffective institutional arrangements, so the stated-owned enterprises should beattention to the ownership structure in the reform.Thirdly, For example, low growth(textile industry, machinery industry) and highgrowth (information technology industry) listed companies(2008-2010) in A sharemarket before2007, study the relationship between performance and capital structurebased on ownership structure, we found that Leverage and performance wassignificantly inverted u-shaped relationship in three industries, and consistent withthe agency cost theory. As leverage is low, the relation between the leverage and theperformance is positive; as leverage is too high, the relation between the leverage andthe performance is negative. In information technology industry, the company withhighest equity concentration has a significant negative concentration that meets“entrenchment” theory. In machinery industry, there is positive relation betweenperformance and leverage. That is the higher the performance of the company has thehigher the leverage ratio which support the efficiency-risk hypothesis which risk isthe dominant influence, the company more efficient than the low efficiency companyhas higher profit ration.Finally, Based on the data analysis of the listed company in2004-2010, theresearch from the manager market aspects of empirical test, the influence ofinnovation from compensation contracts to managers, found that external managers ofstate-owned enterprise relative to the state-owned enterprise managers, internalexternal managers of non-state-owned enterprises relative to the external managers of state-owned enterprise and internal managers of non-state-owned enterprises relativeto the internal managers of state-owned enterprise, can more effective to reduce theenterprise of unproductive spending, reduce enterprise agency cost; Compensationincentive and stockholder’s rights drive production can reduce agency cost in thecertain extent and non-state-owned enterprises is more effective than state-ownedenterprises, the external managers is more effective than internal managers.