Research On The Corporate Governance Of Chinese State-owned Enterprises In The Process Of Mixed Ownership Reform

The reforming of the State Owned Enterprises(SOEs)in China experienced a very tortuous process,which can be found as individual cases in 1980 s,and was expanded from 1993 to now,but confirmation of the concept and theory of the composite-ownership system was later than the reform process.Initialing the trial works,then taking adjustments,and finally solidified in the form of theory and system,this is in line with the action leading theory idea in the reform process in China.In the process of reform,the SOEs need to be corporationed and transformed the shared-owned to all-people-owned enterprises,and the management methods also need to be transformed from state administrative to corporate governance.The transformation of the status of state-owned investor has opened up the process of reforming state-owned companies and the reform of joint-stock companies,and has also started the large-scale behavior of reforming mixed corporate governance.From 1993-2003,market failure and the imperfectness of the legal system caused large amount of losses of state assets during reforming.In order to strengthen the constraints,the state strengthened its position of safeguarding shareholders' rights and interests in the legislative work,which made the corporate governance in China adopted the shareholder board center mode.Later,with the reform of SOEs,large number of enterprises entered the capital market,and many individual investors appeared simultaneously with the state-owned investors together formed the earliest “small and medium shareholders” in China.Their large number and pure financial investment result in corporate governance behavior that has the characteristics of some of the Anglo-American free market models.However,business managers were appointed by state-owned shareholders directly in state-owned enterprises which are the main part in listed companies in China,resulting in the large shareholders and insiders sharing the same interests,formed the character of corporate governance behavior of China and this is a long-delayed issue.China's economy has entered a new normal state,the mixed-ownership reform of SOEs,along with the deepening reforms in mixed ownership economic is needs to speed up and intensify efforts.The traditional corporate governance framework of state-owned enterprises cannot meet the needs of future development.The purpose of this paper is to discuss the typical problems of corporate governance in the mixed reform process of SOEs through the analysis of the reform process of SOEs.Based on this condition,we will discuss the future corporate governance trends and model choices of SOEs' reforming process.The subject of this paper is the governance of state-owned enterprises in the mixed reform process.The dissertation is divided into eight chapters.The first chapter is the introduction,expounds the background and research significance of the topic,the research dynamics and the research method of the thesis,the basic framework and the innovation;the second chapter is the corporate governance connotation and characteristics of the mixed ownership enterprise.This chapter introduces the basic content and framework of the mixed ownership enterprises;the third chapter is the evolution of the role of state-owned contributors from public ownership to mixed ownership reform.This chapter analyzes the causes and history of the mixed reform of state-owned enterprises from the perspective of the status change of state-owned investors;Chapter IV analyzed the problems and causes of state-owned enterprises governance during the reforming process;the fifth chapter is about the analysis of the pseudo corporate governance structure.These two chapters focus on the common problems of all types of enterprises in the mixed reform process in China and the unique problems exposed by SOEs;Chapter Six is characteristics and reference of international corporate governance,including the British and American free market economy corporate governance model,and the corporate governance model of Janance and German social market ceonomy;the seventh chapter is the micro-mechanism of the optimization of corporate governance efficiency of SOEs in the future;the eighth chapter is the corporate governance structure model of mixed state-owned enterprises: history and future trends,and these two chapters describe the development path of the model and the future development trend state-owned corporate governance during the mixed reform process in China and analyzed the main required conditions of the future corporate governance efficiency of SOEs;The last appendix is the case analysis of the efficiency of reformed corporates with state capital,in hope of prove the analysis conclusions and forecast of this paper.The core view of this article can be summarized as that the mixed ownership reform of SOEs resulted from the status change behavior of state-owned contributors,because the socialist market economy is in a process of continuous improvement.At the early stage of economic system development,the government was forced to choose a corporate governance model with the main purpose of protecting its own rights and interests for SOEs.With the continuous improvement of the socialist market economy,the previous governance model will gradually withdraw from the historical stage,giving way to a new,more market-oriented corporate governance model.In the future,the mixed-ownership reform of enterprises highlights in the capital mix.Mixing is not unconditional and boundless,the new mixed reform policy has eliminated discriminatory provisions for ownership,but for specific enterprises,mixed reforms still need more specific conditions and factors in order to run smoothly.State-owned capital,private capital,state-owned enterprises,and private enterprises have developed their own distinct characteristics during the past 40 years of reform,and have continued to grow.The mixed reforms in the new period are based on market needs and the requirements for return on capital,which no longer the disposal of enterprises that had previously been dominated by the administrative orders of “invigorate large enterprises while relaxing control over small ones”.The incompatibility of capital,the lack of understanding among companies,and the incompatibility of behaviors will lead to mixed reform companies failing to meet expectations.From the perspective of some mixed reform cases,the mixed reform of the ideal state requires the cooperation of many factors,but as long as shareholders are still competing for control of insiders in order to realize their own interests,the mixed reform will be distorted and it will lose its attractiveness.The innovations in this dissertation mainly include the following four points: Firstly,The first is to propose the ecology and operation principles of the stakeholder center model.The state-owned investors and creditors work together to improve corporate governance efficiency by allowed to play a new role in corporate governance,thus formed a market-oriented corporate governance framework to guide the capital parties involved in mixed reform to abandon the internal competition.The second innovations is to propose a pseudo corporate governance structure,pointing out a manifestation of the incomplete reform of state-owned enterprises,which eventually led to corporate governance becoming a form,and the investor's management of state-owned enterprises has returned to the old path of administrative management.The third innovation is pointed out that the state-owned contributors which have already shaken off the “ownership vacancy” dilemma from the perspective of corporate governance through reforms,and have filled in “regulatory vacancies”,making the state-owned asset supervision and state-owned enterprise management more market-oriented.The fourth re-examined the main course of the development and reforming of SOEs from the perspective of the role of state-owned investors.The responsibility of gradually transformed into the role of shareholder of major state-owned and joint-stock state-owned enterprises and fulfilled the duties of capital operation and process supervision of the government,which has a three-fold identity as owner,creditor and manager to SOEs as to individual owned corporates,has been analyzed.The research methods used in this dissertation mainly include literature review,historical inspection method,and comparative analysis.These methods play an important role in the research of dissertation.