A Study On American, Indian And Chinese Indian Ocean Maritime Security Strategy

Despite its significant area and its important population, the place of the Indian Ocean in world geopolitics and global geostrategy has long been neglected. Since the late 1960s and the 1970s, the Indian Ocean and its bordering states have been of growing significance in world geopolitics and global geostrategy. And after the end of the Cold War, the region has been in a period of great instability and regional rearrangement that is still ongoing today. All because of the significance of its strategic energy resources such as Persian Gulf oil, its strategic sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and choke points in world affairs, the American-led military interventions, the turbulences of the Islamic world, the’rise of India’as a dominant regional player, as well as China’s recent entry on the regional chessboard, the Indian Ocean Region has definitively reached the forefront of world geopolitics and is considered as an area of crucial geostrategic importance, yet also the most troubled and dangerous area of the world.Being a complex geopolitical framework where foreign powers and local states’ interests deeply intermingle. Since the end of the Cold War, the region has been in a period of great instability and regional rearrangement that is still ongoing today. Taking into account the significance of its strategic energy resources, the importance of its strategic shipping lanes, the’rise of India’as a dominant regional player, the turbulences of the Islamic world, the deep and broad involvement of the United States (and its allies) in the region, as well as China’s recent entry on the regional chessboard, there is no doubt that the Indian Ocean will remain on the forefront of world geopolitics in the coming decades and most probably for the entire twenty-first century.The Indian Ocean Region has a complex puzzle of actors, each with their own vested interests or stakes, interacting in a multilayered time and space, thus forming a fuzzy and very open geopolitical system where the most significant stakes are largely related to foreign great powers’interests, while regional conditions and states are also of great significance. And all these states are facing the challenge of growing significance of non-state players, including terrorist groups, piracy, organised criminal groups, as well as other non-traditional security issues. It is in this volatile and complex geopolitical framework that an intensifying strategic rivalry is developing in the Indian Ocean between the United States, India and China, with all three wanting to secure access to the Persian Gulf oil as well as strategic sea lanes. Thus, USA-India-China relations will largely shape the future of Indian Ocean geopolitics in the coming decades, and most probably for the rest of the twenty-first century.With the growth of maritime perspectives in Indian strategic thinking and driven by great power aspirations and by strategic rivalry with China, India is expanding its naval capabilities and security relationships throughout the Indian Ocean region, with significant attention being paid to developing relationships at the key points of entry into the Indian Ocean. There is now a well established tradition among the Indian strategic community that the Indian Ocean is, or should be "India’s Ocean". Yet India may not be able to surmount for years to come the diverse political, economic, organizational, technological and geopolitical constraints it confronts inside and outside of the country.With vital interest in unobstructed energy and trade flow, growing dependence on the natural resources of the region, and driven by China’s sense of its own rise and its strategic imagination as a natural global power, the Indian Ocean is beginning to acquire some strategic salience for China. Thus the proposition that China is determined to secure permanent footholds in the Indian Ocean gained ground. The mostly widely circulated concept in the West and India about China’s grand design in the Indian Ocean for the past decade or so has been the so-called China’s "string of pearls" strategy which was first crafted by American defense analysts. In general, this term refers to bases and seaports scattered along the sea routes linking the Middle East with coastal China, augmented by diplomatic ties with important states in these regions. But the term is based more on inferences US observers have drawn from Chinese activities in the region than on a coherent national strategy codified in Chinese doctrine, strategic commentary, or official statements. And even hard-nosed US naval analysts realize that the so-called "pearls" by no means represents a trump card for China, either in energy security or military terms. Based on the experience of China’s anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and off Somali coast, foreign analysts conclude that an attractive alternative for Beijing may be an "places not bases" strategy, in which China would have arrangements in place for access to key facilities in strategic locations while refraining from establishing permanent military bases abroad. Both foreign and Chinese analysts agree that China still has significant strategic and operational and force-structure hurdles to overcome in the way ahead for an robust Chinese maritime strategy in the Indian Ocean basin. Chinese analysts in general promulagate a cooperative and inclusive approach to maritime security which is embodied in China’s "Harmonious Ocean" philosophy and Maritime Silk Road initiative.The United States does not have a coherent geopolitical vision of the Indian Ocean Region. The result is an allocation of political and military resources that, with regard to the Indian Ocean Region as a whole, is fractured and at times incoherent, which makes it difficult for the United States to make a credible commitment to the security of the Indian Ocean Region as a whole. The ongoing reassessment of US maritime security posture conducted by the Pentagon and debate on US grand strategy and IO access tells something about possible future alternatives.Judging from the three countries’strategic thought, concerns, interests and power balances, some hold that the US-India potential competition for maritime dominance in the IOR that demands the most attention. However, competition does not mean confrontation. Since the three countries share such similar concerns as sea lane security, mutual interests in combating terrorism and piracy and other non-traditional challenges, it is necessary for them to compete to a reasonable extent while pushing forward with functional cooperation. The future scenario could be one of dynamic and manageable competition, instead of inevitable conflict and rivalry.State-based security relationships in the IOR have tended to be organised at a sub-regional system level, yet there are many ocean-wide security issues of regional and global significance and deserving of further regional analysis and policy development. Efforts to facilitate collective security dialogue and establish maritime security cooperative mechanisms and habits need to be urgently progressed at official, non-official and operational levels. If an Indian Ocean Maritime Security Regime (IOMSR) is to be created, the major dilemma facing IO states is whether it is to be exclusive or inclusive and it is suggested that an inclusive model, built around energy security stakeholders, is much preferred from the viewpoint of long-term regional stability.The thesis concludes with some thoughts on constructing China’s "Harmonious Indian Ocean Strategy".