Research On Consumer-driving Product Safety Responsibility Of Manufacturer-retailer Supply Chain Alliance

This dissertation deals with a supply chain model which consists of manufacturers, distributors and consumers, the manufacturer being divided into two categories g and b , category g does better in fulfilling safety responsibilities , category b does not so well. From one aspect of the corporate social responsibility—consumers'preferences influenced by the product safety performance, the dissertation, based on game theory, does research on the product safety responsibility of manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliance driven by consumers. The research shows that: manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliance fulfilling the safety responsibility better can improve the supply chain's integrated performance.The specific results as follows.Firstly, this dissertation constructs a model of profit coordination model of manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliance based on consumers'preferences to product safety. In the one-time game model, the value range ofβis determined and its digital analysis is done; in repeated game model, the discussion of profit comparison decides whether the two sides get aligned; with the forgoing information, the safety responsibility coordination mechanism based on profit distribution is discussed. The results show that:(1)In the two categories of manufacturer-retailer supply chains, the consulting pricing is the only result of Nash equilibrium in one-game model, and the value of profit distribution factorβis within the range of the agreed, the profits gained after alliance surpass those before alliance. Both manufactures and distributors adheres to unified price is optimal to the long-term profits of both sides.(2)When determining the exact value ofβ, manufactures and distributors should take into consideration the compensation to fulfill the safety responsibility, and distribute the shares of loss caused by product safety risk according to the ratio of profit distribution factorβ.Secondly, the dissertation studies the consumers driving of manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliances fulfilling safety responsibilities. It includes: the decision-making of consumer-driven supply chain in safety responsibilities; the consumer pressure in safety responsibility of manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliances. The results show that:(1)category g fulfill the safety responsibilities better, can work up consumers'desire to buy g products, gain more profits, and thus boost the incentive of category g to cement their safety responsibility performance; if category g fails to fulfill the safety responsibility, consumers will refuse to buy g products to drive category g into good safety responsibilities.(2)Under the circumstances that the expect profits gained by target manufacturer-retailer alliances when they satisfy the requirements of consumers are no less than when not, the target manufacturer-retailer alliances will choose to satisfy consumers'requirements. When profits gained from competition are more than competition cost, both sides will choose to compete, which means the desire to compete is determined by their expectation of profits.Thirdly, the dissertation studies the strategies of safety responsibilities in manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliances driven by consumers. It includes: the relationship between market failure and safety responsibilities in manufacturer-retailer supply alliance; the relationship between safety responsibilities in manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliances and competition ability; safety responsibility strategies based on profit distribution. The results show that:(1)In short term, at some times the safety responsibility may lead up to profit loss. But in the long run, fulfilling the safety responsibility better can strengthen the manufacturer-retailer alliance's competition ability.(2)Manufacturers can distribute profits by allotting profit distribution factorβ, and then decide the whole-sale price. If distributors don't agree, manufacturers can adjust the value ofβ, and give away some profits as the incentive to distributors.(3) All in all, in the upstream of the supply chain, whether manufacturers g can well implement safety responsibilities, divide products of different scales by safety responsibilities, transport the difference signal to the consumers, and then determines consumers'purchase, is the key to realize the Pareto optimization upper stream manufacturers, middle-stream distributors and down-stream consumers.Finally, based on the driven of consumers, the dissertation studies the theory of signaling of manufacturer-retailer alliances under asymmetrical safety information. The result show:(1)under asymmetrical information, category g manufacturer-retailer alliance sends out a signal that category b can't replicate, which can differentiate products in safety responsibility, so consumers can make the right choice according to the safety information.(2)category g manufacturer-retailer alliance can build a good social image and bring up expected profits by actively sending signals of safety. Though the signaling cost is high, once category g manufacturer-retailer alliance is chosen by consumers,a large sum of profits is gained.To sum up,if category g manufacturer-retailer alliance sends out a fairly moderate safety signal to consumers, a desirable divide of market is realized, and solve the problem that products b may repel g products, a good social image is built, profits rise, and competitive power of g manufacturer-retailer alliance is also strengthened.