The Application Research Of Auction Theory On Logistics Transactions

Essentially, the auction is a process of deciding the price and allocation of resources, and a powerful tool to build an open, fair and efficient trading market. Auction is also one of the most important applications of the incomplete information game. With the development of economic and the emergence of modern logistics represented by the third-party logistics industry, there forms a corresponding logistics market. In this market, the demand and supply of logistics services is a principal-agent relationship. Under the premise of this market, the providers of logistics services have information superiority compared with the demand side. So that the traditional transaction methods (price, bargaining), compared not with auction trading, can not understand the true market value of logistics service in such a wide range by such convenient and low-cost way, and form the transaction prices finally. Meanwhile, to realize the social welfare maximization, Government will manage the scarce logistics resources by selling franchise by auction, and so on. Purpose of this paper is, in this market environment, design the auction trading rules to achieve the effective logistics services trade, and the efficient allocation of logistics resources.Due to the differences of their management ability, technical ability, and operational capacity, Suppliers of logistics have different of supply costs and service quality. Based on the competitive bidding of Logistics service providers, the auction mechanism can distinguish different enterprises with different connotations in the supply capacity, to achieve efficient allocation of logistics resources. When the supply and demand information of logistics spread more extensive, the allocation of logistics resources will be achieved more effectively. The rapid development of information technology provides a powerful tool for information dissemination and aggregation. Based on Internet technology, logistics information center and auctions trading center make the logistics transactions become increasingly feasible in a variety of logistics market structure through designing more diversified auction mechanisms. Logistics auction has many advantages, such as transaction cost savings, fast matching of supply and demand, and expand the scope of potential markets, improve information flow and enhance the advantages of supply chain integration, and so on. The auction trading system based on information technology has many features, such as the more participate individual, the transaction time is short, and low cost of entry and exit. This paper attempts to use the latest achievements of auction to the logistics market in China, then through more efficient logistics transactions to achieve the optimal allocation of resources. The main conclusions are as follows.First, this paper analyzes the economy reforms from a planned economy to market, and the change process that the traditional means of production and distribution companies link to modern logistics enterprises. The shift is representative of by the rise and sustainable high-speed development of specialized third-party logistics, and, final, decide of the current and future logistics market structure. In the process, several types of logistics enterprises including the formation of collective ownership, private enterprises and joint-stock of the logistics enterprises become the Principal transactions in this market. Just due to the emergence, growing, and its features of these counterparties make auction transactions have a viable basis for application. Based on this market conditions, this paper, through analyzes the relationship between of demand-side and supply-side of logistics, points out that there is information asymmetry between them, and auctions is one of the most simple transactions way in this Information structure. And this paper further explore, based on the modern Internet-based technologies, the important function of the auction trading platform witch together the supply and demand information of logistics throughout the regional market.Second, in this article, several types of auction issues were studied in different market structure, including multi-attribute transactions, bilateral transactions and combination transactions. First, the logistics value of many products is very sensitive to the realization degree of a number of quality indicators, Such as cold chain logistics, and the traditional auction format witch only consider the transaction price has limitations. This article introduce multi-attribute auction theory to logistics procurement with multiple attributes requested transaction, and, for the logistics quality requirements of many companies outside of the price, design of an integrated score auction model. Analysis of their optimal strategy and score function selection based on the cost function and utility function of the bidder. Second, in the logistics trading market, for the same logistics services, there often has many suppliers and many demanders at the same time. For example, the warehousing and distribution services, freight business of the spot market in a regional market just are the market structure of bilateral trade. Double auction break with the localization of the traditional auction with "one to many" market structure, analyzes the "many to many" market structure, then allows the buyers and sellers being an equality relationship of supply and demand. This article discusses the logistics double auction trading mechanism witch automatic configuring trading volume and generating price. And the paper proves the rule meet the incentive compatibility constraint and rational participation constraint. Third, due to their own business or cost considerations, logistics suppliers and logistics buyers in many cases have the demand of combination trading for a number of logistics projects from the raw materials ended to the consumer side of the physical chain. This article discusses the combination of logistics auction trading mechanism witch making of this combination of demand to be able to achieve. At the same time, this mechanism takes into account the multi-attribute constraints, and proves that the mechanism meet the incentive compatibility constraints and rationality participation constraint. Meanwhile, this article discussed, when take the cooperative binding as a combination constraint, the role of combinatorial auction in inspiritting enterprise to maximize its own benefit, and then maximize the social welfare.Third, in the current, economic regions are showing the regional logistics center trend. When the market uncertainty is high, the fixed assets investment of regional logistics center will be less. How to grasp the fixed assets investment volume from the whole region will help solve contradiction between supply and demand of specific logistics. This article design a new bidding mechanism to solve these two issues and maximize the entire region social welfare, and the new method has the merits of both the stable of supply and competitive inspirit. Through simulation, the new bidding mechanism can help better avoid a serious imbalance between supply and demand generated by high market volatility. And, at the same time, because it can reduce the risk of a dedicated investment in fixed assets, so some extent reduce the acquisition cost of the tender side. This method schedule from the global region, and logistics supply-side is more fully competitive, the help build an open and efficient regional logistics market, and the achievement of regional social welfare maximization.Fourth, in the logistics industry, the port, railways and other resources are scarce public resources, and in order to improve efficiency in the use and management of these logistics resources, government more and more use auction to achieve the social value of these resources. On the other hand, the logistics enterprises in a competitive bidding process for these resources, also have an incentive to reduce competition by collusion to get more trade surplus. At this stage, monopoly is also very clear in many types of logistics industries in China's. Limited number of enterprises let collusion being possible. This article analyzes some possible mechanisms in this market conditions, and shows by the example. And this paper think, the Government, in order to prevent collusion, should further open market access to bring more of new enterprise into the market. Through rise competition, the collusions of logistics enterprises can be compress in a limited range, even eliminate collusion.