Study On Our Country's Securities Regulation Efficiency Improvement

China is a new-emerging securities market. Although a kind of centralized regulatory structure model was set up in our country, the low efficiency of regulation is still a serious issue at present. It is of significance in both theory and reality to analyze the cause formation of low efficiency in our country's securities market, and devise a model to reform and increase its efficiency. This dissertation, based on the analytical framework of economics concerning the system allotment efficiency of and operation efficiency, and by applying the incomplete theory of law under the new instrument economics, public enforcement theory concerning the theory of causes of securities regulation and the theory of allotment of regulation power, and the incentive theory of information economics, tries to construct a new model to increase regulation efficiency under the influence of allotment of regulation power and incentive of regulators and put forward some suggestions on how to implement this model.This paper is made up of 8 chapters. Chapter 1, as an introductory part, deals with the thesis-chosen background, research significance, basic mode of thought and structure. Chapter 2 gives a general review and appraisal of the literature about the securities regulation efficiency at home and abroad. Chapter 3 gives a general description of the status of our country's securities regulation and some issues that we are facing, and make an analysis of the reason causing securities regulation low efficiency. Chapter 4, as a theoretic part, analyses the effectiveness test of the securities regulation and its cost profits. With the analytical framework of "allotment efficiency" and "operation efficiency" of instrument economics as a reference, tries to construct an double-factor analytical model of securities regulation efficiency, by applying the incomplete theory of law, discusses the efficiency improvement under the optimized regulation structure, and with the help of analytical tool-trust agency in the contract theory, analyses the influences that the encouragement measures to the regulators exerted on the securities regulation efficiency. Chapter 5, as a positive analysis part, first gives a comparison securities regulation between countries, and makes a analysis of the low efficiency from the aspect of regulation to IPO and regulation enforcement. Chapter 6 is about the devising of the model on how to improve the regulation efficiency, which is a new regulation structure model combined our country's new-type centralization with self-discipline. It works out a mechanism as a selection on how to encourage and constrain the regulators. further the more,it discusses how to realize this model to improve the low efficiency. From the viewpoint of the idea of changing securities regulation, building a correct relationship between the government and the regulation, de-administration of regulation power, it raises the advice on how to ensure the independence of regulation power. And from the aspect of regulation competition, judicial involvement, media supervising, devises some measures to encourage regulators. Chapter 7 is about the thesis conclusion and problems for future research.The thesis conclusion is that the imbalance of the allotment of regulation power is the instrument reason which effects the low regulation efficiency. Besides, the lack of encouragement mechanism is another reason which effects the operation of regulation efficiency. Therefore, by rebuilding a new model of securities regulation structure and encouragement mechanism to the regulators, it aims to improve and increase our country's securities regulation efficiency. The countermeasures and suggestions are embodies in:change regulation idea, establish a smooth relationship between the government and regulation, de-administrate the regulation power, and introduce the third party regulation and perfect the engagement of judiciary to the regulation and counterbalance mechanism.