Study On The Multilateral Property Rights Of The Large-sized State-owned Enterprises

1.The significance and purpose of the subjectChina is in transional course from planned economy to market one. The large—sized State—owned enterprises are the nuclear part as well as the typical one of the planned economic system. Though the reformation of China's large—sized State—owned enterprises has been remarkable, it isn't enough turning up trumps. Now, the large—sized State—owned and State—controlling enterprises are very important in our whole economy, and it is urgent to study their mechanism for healthy development.2.The main contents of the thesisThe thesis searches of the theorecticl foundation for reforming the ownership of China's large—sized State—owned enterprises. Based on reviewing Chinese and foreign country's theories on enterprise ownership, analyzes the course that the empty original bodies of the State stock and its special entrusting—agenting relation induces serious dissipation of the controlling power of the State stock. The State shareholders should be free—riders with non—State ones because of their weak controlling power of the State property rights, so the State—owned enterprises should draw some non—State shareholders.Review the practice course of China's large—sized State—owned enterprises ownership's reformation, hold the situation of ownership structure of China's large—sized State—owned enterprises,and analyze the shortcomings of the too haigh ratio of the State shares keeped by the State shareholders as the largest one.The thesis studies the goal of China's large—sized State—owned enterprises ownership reformation, i.e., all the China's large—sized State—owned enterprises should establish mixed shares structure with the State shares and non—State ones that existing diversionary shareholders, except the farthing large—sized State—owned enterprises that should keep monopoly operation by the State and those that must be closed up. The thesis studies the means for China's large—sized State—owned enterprises to establish mixed shares structure with the State shares and non—State ones, i.e., the way with capital amount inceasing, the way with selling the State—owned property rights, and the way of exchanging the shares. There are many specific modes and they are always used mixedly during the large—sized State—owned enterprises ownership reformation.The emphases for China's large—sized State—owned enterprises to structure their ownership are dynamic. In the near future, the emphases are as follows: the non—public and semipublic State—owned enterprises; smaller large—sized ones; embarrassment ones; local ones; pure State—owned enterprises or companies; grand—companies and subsidiary ones. In the metaphase or long term, the emphases are as follows: public large—sized State—owned enterprises; oversize ones; good ones; center ones; the State—controlling ones; parent companies.The measures for China's large—sized State—owned enterprises to structure their ownership are as follows: transferring the ideas about the relation between structuring China's large—sized State—owned enterprises'ownership and the dominant status, and the State—owned assets losing; deepening the reformation of China's management system of the State—owned assets,seperating the two sorts of fuctions of management departments of the State—owned assets and definiting their role in order to drive China's large—sized State—owned enterprises to structure their ownership rationally; perfecting China's policies on structuring the large—sized State—owned enterprises'ownership and encouraging non—State investors to participating in China's large—sized State—owned enterprise ownership's reformation. The coorperating conditions for carrying China's large—sized State—owned enterprise ownership's reformation are as follows: Perfecting China's policies on practicing, standardizing the rules so that we can improve China's large—sized State—owned enterprise ownership's reformation and prevent the State—owned assets losing; removing the historical and social burdens with large—sized State—owned enterprises, perfecting the social security institution, financing of the cost for large—sized State—owned enterprise ownership's reformation, perfecting the markets of exchanging property rights.3. The main innovation pointsFirst, introduces the concept"dissipation"in enterprise theory. The original meaning of"dissipation"is the course for exchanging materials, energies, messages of an open system with the outside world. Here, the meaning of"dissipation"is the course for exchanging the power for property rights'controlling. The meaning of"dissipation"can be understand as that bating of the owners'power of controlling their shares.Secondly, the paper researches the cotrolling power of the shareholders of different kinds of shares. Basically, there exist the relaions as follows: private shares'cotrolling power exceeds that of corporate shares, and the cotrolling power of corporate shares exceeds that of the State shares. Analogously, the cotrolling power of managers'private shares exceeds that of common staff shares, and corporate shares, the cotrolling power of common staff shares exceeds that of external private shares.Thirdly, this paper studies the large—sized State—owned enterprises'ownership structuring from the angle of the dissipation of cotrolling power of the State shares. This paper analyzes the course that the empty original bodies of the State ownership and its special entrusting—agenting relation induces serious dissipation of the controlling power of the State shares. The State shareholders should be free—riders with non—State ones because of their weak controlling power of the State property rights, so the State—owned enterprises should draw some non—State shareholders.Fourthly, the paper proves that different nodes included the entrusting—agenting chain will dissipate different controlling power of the State property rights, some are high dissipation, some are low dissipation, and some are uncertain dissipation. This situation is very important for us to definite the ratioe of the State shares of China's large—sized State—owned enterprise ownership's reformation.Fifthly, the paper proves that the emphases for China's large—sized State—owned enterprises to structure their ownership are dynamic.Finally, the paper advances many new proposals, for example, seperating the two sorts of fuctions of management departments of the State—owned assets and definiting their role in order to drive China's large—sized State—owned enterprises to structure their ownership rationally.