On Institutional Equilibrium Of Land Use Planning Of China In Transitional Period

Since the development of land use planning of China in earlier 1950's, the institutions of land use planning had been changing with the practice of planning, and the system of the current planning was gradually came into being. Ever since the reforming and opening policies, China has entered into an overall transitional period of socio-economy with the economic system as center by transforming from Plan oriented to market oriented. As the first plans had been terminated in the course, and again the second plans had been drawn up after remarkable adjustment in thought, theory, goal and method of planning under the current institutional frame. The second plans had played some certain positive role in many aspects, such as protecting arable land and controlling the blind expansion of construction land by adopting strictly the means of land use regulation. However, the facts still remains that the action of encroaching land had been prevalent, and that it is hard to control the development of excessive consumption of arable land and serious waste of land resource. At the same time, there had been widespread phenomenon on too frequent adjusting of the plans and using land by violating the planning. This resulted in the differenty in playing the role of restrainting, adjusting and controlling mechanism of planning. This pushed many scholars or experts to profoundly consider the current theoretical research of land use planning. Generally, and they judged that the current system fail to meet the current requirement of socio-economical development for theory, method and means of land use planning, and then could not also serve its illustration function. Therefore it is imperative to reveal the dynamic mechanism in the system, explain the dilemma of the implementation process and construct land use planning with the condition of market economy.The purpose of the dissertation strives to construct the analytical frame on institutional equilibrium of land use planning of China in transitional period, and go on discussing the reasons of the dilemma experienced in implementation of the current planning of China from the perspectives of institutional supply and demand, cost and game in light of new institutional economy and game theory. Furthermore, the dissertation tries to investigate and analyze institutional demand bodies and its behavior, the institutional cost and game of different stakeholders on the influence of institutional equilibrium of planning, in order to make new explanation for the trouble arisen from it. It offers the theoretical basis for the balanced system of land use planning in China. The dissertation consists of seven chapters and Can be divided into five parts. They are the institutional identification and the analysis on institutional supply and demand, costs, game of land use planning, and the conclusion and Suggestion. Major contents of every part are shown as follows:The first part is composed of three chapters. The first chapter is an introduction, the second one is on the summary of the research and the third is on institutional identification of land use planning. In this section, the dissertation has explored its connotation, essence and function, and the brief process of institutional change on the basis of commentary on researches of land use planning and its institution both at home and abroad by analyzing the present situation of its implementation on the background of the socio-economy transitional period of China. At the same time, with the method of typical case and questionnaire, the dissertation mainly discusses the composition and character, analyzes the enforcement effect and dilemma of land use planning, and then generalizes the analytical framework of institutional equilibrium on land use planning ~of China in transition period, and so provides the foundation for the analysis of institutional supply and demand, cost and game of land use planning.The second part is the fourth chapter, which analyzes the institutional supply and demand of land use planning. In this section, the dissertation has elaborated the main content and interest among various stakeholders of landuse planning in enforcement in the beginning of the institutional requirement on land use planning in transitional period of socio-economy. Besides, classifying stakeholders of planning in the theory, the author defines the institutional demand bodies of the current planning. Based on this, by the method of questionnaire, the author goes on the investigation on demand wishes of various stakeholders from the main content of planning, such as arable protection, constructed land and the decision of planning, and then clarifies the motivation of various stakeholders. This has furnished substantial realistic basis for the institutional analysis of supply and demand of planning. At last, this section did a further analysis of the institutional supply bodies and its goals of the current planning on the basis of the third chapter, and thus makes some explaination in detail on the dilemma of implementing the current planning of China from the perspective of institutional supply and demand.The third part is the fifth chapter, which researches on institutional cost of land use planning. In this section, the dissertation goes on research on the composition of institutional Cost of the current planning on the theoretical basis of model of institutional cost and benefit, the factors and composition of institutional cost composition in the beginning of the economic logic, standard of institutional choice and the denefition of planning's cost in light of institutional economy. Meanwhile, the dissertation poses the basic framework and main content of institutional costs of the current planning of China, and researches on the cost of planning institution from three levels, such as local interest groups, the inner of local interest groups and local government with the method of questionnaire. Moreover, the dissertation has carried out estimation research with the conducted cost of planning institution with the method of typical case and questionnaire. Thus, it has offered theoretical foundation on analyzing the mechanism of cost restraint in the enforcement dilemma of planning.The fourth part is the sixth chapter, which focuses on institutional game of land use planning. In this section, according to game theory, firstly, the dissertation proposes the problems and type of institutional game of the current planning based on the existing key issue during the transition period of socio-economy in China; Secondly, the dissertation put forward the theoretical game model during the process of make-decision and enforcement at the point of the game problem of planning; Finally, adopting the method of questionnaire inquiry and typical case, the dissertation goes on the game analysis of arable land protection, construction land and decision of planning from three levels: central and local government, the inner of local benefit group and local government. Therefore, the dissertation gives explanation in detail to the dilemma of implementing planning from the interest equilibrium among various interest groups, and this provide theoretical basis for building up the balanced institution of land use planning of China.The conclusion are arrived as follows:(1)The institution of land use planning should be considered as the integration of a series of rules that might be formed in the course of authorized, enforcement and management, such as policy, law and technological norm, as well as the mechanism of restraining and encouraging its interaction among various stakeholder. It changes along with the change of socio-economical institution, and has three functions including reducing the transaction cost, offering mechanism of restraining and encouraging interaction, and creating the cooperative condition in planning process. The dissertation has significance in looking closely at the current planning institution of China from the perspective of new institutional economy, explaining the dilemma in implementing the current planning, and setting up the planning institution that meets land resource allocation under the Condition of market economy.(2)The current institution of land use planning still follows the pattern of the planned economy, and stressing the collective aspect from institutional supply to running, yet overlooking the influence of the individual reason on the collective reason. The result is the defective the institution of planning:â‘ the main body of institutional supply is very single-folded, and the power of making decision is excessivly centralized, and so that it does not reflect demand wishes of planning institution of various stakeholder;â‘¡the balance of benefit and responsibility is negelected in the indices distribution between land conservation and constructed land, and so has lost its deserved mechanism of fair and incention;â‘¢the role of Control and organization of planning is strengthened, and yet the coordination and supervisor is weakened. So, it is hard to fit the development of market economy, and then becomes one of major reasons that lead to the dilemma of implementing the current planning in China.(3) During the process of land use planning which integrated scientific, technical and political course, there is interest deviation of various interest groups. The institutional essence of planning are a set of rules of planning power and interest distribution that focuses on three key contents including arable land protection, constructed land and planning decision. The rules of protecting arable land may stipulate the social responsibility of various interest groups, the rules of constructed land will balance and control the benefit for each interest group, and the decision rules may allocate the power of planning. For the institutional demand of planning, the starting point of local government is the influence of local financial resources and cadre's achievements. While defending public benefit, enterprise group's offers minimum transaction cost, and yet village groups protect their own benefit at maxition limit.(4) The current institution of planning is supplied unitarily by the central government and its power of making decision, enforcement and supervisor is centralized and focused, and this causes some facts of decision center. And the decision center makes it difficult to restrain the value of local government and its official, also then hard to form mechanism of restrainting perfectly microcosmic action, so yet has affected the fair and justice of planning. Under the current institution, this also causes imbalance between institutional demand and supply of planning, and forms the alliance of local economic increase, and yet make the institution of planning become the important tool of stronger interest groups in order to gain its own benefit, and this has decreased the whole social efficiency of land resource allocation. In fact, this indicates that local government connives enterprise to use land by violating planning or breaking the law. At the same time, local interest group can make its cost externality through the shift of public property by planning institution, and eventually this cost will be undertaken by the whole society, and also alienates the key value of planning institution. Evidently, the discrepancy of the goal function and condition of different interest groups makes deviation with the goal of institutional supply with the demand of planning, and then becomes one of important reasons of hardly protecting arable land, controlling land use for construction, and modifing frequently plans.(5) The institutional cost of land use planning is composed of the production Cost and transaction cost, and its core is the transaction cost. Yet, its main body of institutional supply pays attention to produce cost, and overlooks transaction cost, and then cause to lack in administrative efficiency of government and its official at different levels. It is incomplete in the cost restraint mechanism for behavior of local government. During the process of various stakeholder, the restraint of institutional cost in current planning is unfastened, and does not cause the effect of restraining the spontaneous self-interest behavior in different stakeholders. The ineffectiveness of planning leads to waste the huge society of resource, and this cost will be undertaken alone by central government. Thus, this indicates that it is one of reasons for paying attention to planning institution by only central government, yet not by other interest groups.(6) Between game of central and local government, central government compels with planning institution to determine indices and responsibility undertaker of protecting land resources. However, it can not accuratly grasp specific behavior information of local government, and so has weak information. As agency, local government has the advantage of asymmetrical information for central government. Therefore, in practice, local government forms a set of tactful scheme of "go up policy, countermeasure" using informatiOn asymmetry, and so this is one of major factors that cause dilemmn for implementing the current land use planning of China.(7) The core of game in local government focuses on self interest of local government at different level, and mainly embodies in the indices of protecting arable land and allocating construction land. The strategy of upper government centers on the power of regulation of land resource allocation in a straight way, and yet the lower level government adopts uncooperative action, and so cause planning institution lacking in effective mechanism of encouragement and restriction, then it does not work for the relation between entrustment and agency of public power. Meanwhile, the core of game among the same level local government and its sector is the allocational right of land use and space location, the strategy of garner negates decisiOn in a mutual way, and thus reduces the administrative efficiency of government. (8) Land use planning should be thought to be the course of making and implementing policy with the support from scientific technology, and would be in harmony with technology and politics. In reality, there are still the ineffectiveness of relation between entrustment and agency, and also more and more rent-seeking in planning institution. It showed that land use planning can not be confined only in plans and control, but emphasize the combination with science, technology and politics together. Yet, it still lack in theory of the social learning and mobilization in the theoretical research on land use planning institution of China to this day. In specific, as the social campaign course, land use planning should emphasize the interest demand of different stakeholders, and then would construct a kind of coordinative mechanism of interest to make institutional equilibrium of land use planning realization. So, planners should step into the society, undertake the role of spreading the knowledge, educating the public, and promoting public participation.In short, the dissertation construct the analysical frame on institutional equilibrium of land use planning of China in transitional period from the perspectives of institutional supply and demand, cost and game in light of new institutional economy, and this offers a brand-new perspectives for theoretical research of the planning. And, the dissertation systematically puts forwards the institutional explanation on the implementation dilemma of the current planning of China, and used the logic method of "specific phenomenon, fact and data, the law of fact, theoretical explanation", and this furnishes theoretical basis to study the institutional equilibrium of land use planning of China in transitional period, and then has great reality significance. However, due to the limitation of theoretical knowledge, and time, this paper is still not enough to reveal the inner mechanism of institutional equilibrium and quantitative analysis method of land use planning, and thus the further research in this field is needed.