Choice Of Strategic Alliances Forms And Risk Control

in order to raise the management level of our enterprises in strategicalliances, by employing the games theory and principal-agent theory ininformation economics, four important features such as the choice ofalliance structure, the selection of alliance partner, determination ofalliance form and risk control of alliance in the operation and managementof strategic alliances are investigated in this dissertation. Thesignificantly main results are as follows.1. In terms of the viewpoint of industry organization theory andstrategic management, and adopting Resource-Based Rational andTransaction cost Rational, three types of firms'behavior mode ofstrategic alliances and market trade and internalization aredistinguished. Particularly, the two outside expand modes of bothstrategic alliances and merger & acquisition are comparatively researchedfrom the aspect of history, concept, reason, and so forth. Therefore, theconnotation characters of the two modes are depicted and the conditionof selecting strategic alliances for enterprises is provided.2. The decision-making model of selecting strategic alliance forms isdesigned, which consists of eight parts, i.e., they are the identificationof the core competence, properties of required technology or competenceand approach of accessing to it, multinational firms alliances or domesticfirms alliances, cooperation partner selection, the choice of allianceforms, the choice of co-operation modes, the choice of value chain fields,risk control.3. The problem on how different enterprise characters and variousindustry features affect the choice of alliance forms is exploredaccording to system's research mechanism. Different enterprisecharacters include different resources, different technology competences,different position of value chains, different extent of collaboration,different life cycles of both products and technologies of firms, etc.Various industry features comprise industry competition, market admitentry and the needs of realizing cost advantage, the properties of industryand / or market, object of alliance, and so on.456. Both the equilibrium structure and the size of strategic alliancescan be selected through adopting the more stage dynamic game's approach,and the conditions of enterprise's entrance into alliance are acquired.The choice for both alliance forms with different competition andcooperation mode and multinational entry modes with different structuresof property right is studied through adopting the same more stage dynamicgame's approach.. The difficulty of strategic alliance partner selection is solvedthrough the theory of principal-agent of information economics, at thesame time, their adverse selection of hidden information and moral hazardof hidden action existing in selecting alliance partners are also settleddown.. We find that the relational risk of alliance members deviating fromalliances in equity alliances, such as joint venture, is often greaterwhen product demand is high in the market. To moderate and resolve therelational risk, the contract scheme of trigger strategy andcarrot-and-stick is derived through adopting repeated dynamic game'sapproach. A single-task optimal incentive, monitoring scheme, i.e., thescheme inside and outside an enterprise and a more-tasks optimal incentivescheme are designed using the theory of principal-agent of informationeconomics in order to avoid producing moral hazard of alliance membersin equity alliances.