Economic Aid Diplomacy "leverage" Construct

Economic Diplomacy has been widely employed in international politics. Decision-makers increasingly prefer using Economic Aid Diplomacy (EAD) as one of the effective statecrafts. Great powers, already established or on the rise, invariably attempt to utilize its political leverage to protect and/or advance their security interests vis-à-vis weaker nation-states, with which to affect their decision-making process and foreign policy behaviors. For a long time, however, there lacks in-depth studies of the motives, consequences and effectiveness of EAD. Guided by the theoretical assumptions of Neo-Mercantilism in the International Political Economy (IPE), this dissertation tries to define EAD and, more importantly, analyze why sovereign states use economic means to meet their political ends. In addition, it strives to reconcile IPE's theoretical hypothesis (i.e., EAD can leverage recipients in accordance with the logic of Rational Choice Theory) with historical evidence. Given the disparity between theory and practice, four independent variables, structural, strategic, domestic and external, have been put forward. The correlation between these four variables and leverage-building (dependent variable for this analysis) has been examined through three cases in the Cold War period, namely the United States Four-Point program from Truman to Eisenhower in 1950s, the Soviet Union's economic aid to China from 1954 to 1960, and China's economic aid to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam from 1961 to 1973. To testify the theoretical assumptions of EAD, this dissertation relies on the newly declassified Chinese and foreign archives and historical material. The ideas of common security and win-win cooperation are advanced, which can forge a guide to China's EAD in the new era of 21st century, making EAD better serve the strategy of peaceful development and the overall foreign aim of building harmonious world.