The Inner Time Consciousness In Husserl Phenomenology

The topic of this research is Husserl's phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time. The main text is based on "Texte zur Phdnomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins(1893-1917)" and "Die Bernau Manuskripte uber das Zeitbewusstsein(1917/18)" and other text concerning this topic. The main method used in this thesis is interpretation, the primary aim is to develop a coherent picture of Husserl's understanding of the time-constituting consciousness, and then I want to comment on his theory, try to find out a direction which I can continue in this topic.Firstly, I want to analysis the text before "the lecture on the Consciousness of Internal Time from the year 1905". We can find out the relation between Husserl's investigation of time-consciousness and his theory in the "Logische Untersuchungen". The most important achievement in these texts is the concept of "fresh memory" (frische Erinnerung). Through this concept, the past-consciousness will be divided, a part of it has the function in the construction of perception, this part is named "fresh memory".In the text of "the lecture on the Consciousness of Internal Time from the year 1905" and some supplements, Husserl modifies the concept of "fresh memory" and adopts "retention", aim to emphasize the role this concept plays in the perception of individual object. And then Husserl raises the "Zeithof" structure, which constitutes by the "originary impression", "retention" and "protention", this structure is a fixed form that any individual object mast has.In the text of "the lecture on the Consciousness of Internal Time from the year 1905", we can find out only a little discussion about protention. Until in the L-Manuscript, Husserl began to pay attention to the concept of protention, he claimed that retention and protention interwoven each other in the construction of time-consciousness. The reinterpretation of protention makes the investigation turn to the field of genetic phenomenology.Because of the double intentionality of retention, the act that constructs the individual object and the individual object are both in the flow of time-consciousness, they are different stages of the construction of inner object, and the act that constructs the inner object is constructed as inner object at the same time. Husserl used the model of Auffassungsinhalt-Auffassung (Schema) to explain the construction of inner object, but it gives rise to an infinite regress. To solve this dilemma, Husserl proposed another idea. In this idea, Husserl interpreted firstly the "original process" (Urprozess), he claimed that the original process didn't contain apprehension in its emergence and fade away. Only in reflection, the constructive act undergoes objectivation.The original process stream is also a stream of raw material, and also a stream of ego's original life (Urleben). It gives rise to two meaning of ego, namely, in the sense of apprehension and in the sense of the stream of experience. Husserl analyzed these two meaning of ego in his works-"Cartesian Meditation", furthermore he gave a new meaning of ego, ego as substrate of habitualities. This interpretation opens a new area to phenomenology, the area of genetic phenomenology. Now the investigation of time-consciousness has reached the level of ego, it is the the maximum extent for a single subject. When we ask how to avoid the dilemma of solipsism, and how to achieve objectivity, it involves the question of intersubjectivity. Husserl still insisted the principle of transcendental ego, he tried to construct the Other, and then construct the intersubjectivity on the basis of transcendental ego. This is to bring the ego's temporality as the foundation of temporality of intersubjectivitiy. I think his effort is failed, but the way that he opened is worthy of study.The question of individuation is also an emphasis. We can find out many texts which investigate this question, both in the "Texte zur Phanomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins(1893-1917)" and "Die Bernau Manuskripte uber das Zeitbewusstsein(1917/18)". The question of individuation in the field of time-consciousness is the question of objectivity. What apprehend in the time-consciousness isn't pure extend, but extend of something, the subjects of extend also have many differences.This study does not provide the whole picture of Husserl's phenomenology of time-consciousness. First of all, the paper this study involves can not cover all of the manuscript pertaining to time-consciousness. Secondly, from the characteristics of Husserl's phenomenology, Husserl himself didn't think his investigation is a conclusion, but a starting point.