Intersubjectivity:Meaning And Time-The Relation And Difference Between Schutz And Husserl

Alfred Schutz’phenomenological-sociology not only blended Husserl’s phenomeno-logy and social sciences, but also applied the method of phenomenology to the social world, The theoretical relationship between Schutz’ phenomenological-sociology and Husserl’s phenomenology has multi-dimensions, Schutz’ attitude to Husserl’s phenomenology didn’t run through his whole theory. This essay, devoting to the problem of intersubjectivity, aims at Schutz’s understanding of the phenomenology of Husserl and to trace the former’s changing position from a cautious confidence into the potentialities of phenomenology to the critical inspection of ever-widening ranges of Husserl’s thinking. In his book of1932, Schutz had clearly stated where, within the total scope of Husserl’s philosophy, his own theoretical interests were located. As to problem of intersubjectivity, he began with his analyses of the phenomena of constitution in inner-time consciousness, which contains a original tension between unbroken stream of inner-time living experiences and acts of reflecting, recognizing, identifying. Such living experiences lack in meaning and discrete identity. When we turn around and bring to bear upon them of acts of reflection, recognition, identification, the experience acquires meaning. With the concept of meaning and a complex of meaning or context of meaning, and the schemes of experience as interpretive schemes, Schutz demonstrated the possibility of intersubjectivity and described it. However, with the deepening of his thinking on this problem, he pointed out that Husserl’s the fifth of the Cartesian Meditations--Husserl thought he had "already offered the essential starting points" for solving the problem of intersubjectivity--attempting to demonstrate the constitution of transcendental intersubjectivity as the achievement of the transcendental ego did not succeed. And he also proposed a different theory from Husserl about intersubjectivity, which can be summarized as three points. The first is his unique understanding to the phenomenological reduction, the second is that he set up a new time stipulation different from inner-time as "the vivid present", the last is that he depended on the concept of meaning rather than intentionality. Although Schutz, in some degree, finally parted with philosophical inquiry, and also phenomenological inquiry, Husserl’s influence on him is impressive and ubiquitous. He is a phenomenological-sociologist, and also, he is a phenomenologist.