Farness And Nearness Of Metaphysics

Heidegger's relationship to metaphysics lies in the core zone in his thought of being, and this relation is also a very important subject-matter in Heidegger's circle. However, it has long failed to bring about any general agreement on the mode of performance, substantial connotation, development process and possible consequence of the relationship. With the help of rereading into Heidegger's texts and looking into some typical research achievements, this research closely goes around the fundamental assertion which says that metaphysics has a twofold onto-theo-logical (onto-theo-logische) constitution since around 1937, and attempts to demonstrate that, (1) the assertion that, there is a twofold onto-theo-logical approach in metaphysics, is precisely Heidegger's philosophical interpretation he was confronted with the fundamental political-ethical dilemma in current epoch for a radical understanding and a solution to it; (2) this assertion not only result from his destructive repetition (Wiederholung) of metaphysics, but also is appropriate to his previous exploration of thinking, that is to say, fundamental ontology is characteristic of essential-transcendental questioning with a ontological approach in the period of 1917-1927, while metontology (Metontologie) has general character of existential-transcendent questioning with a theological approach during the period of 1927-1937; (3) detructuring (Destruktion) always plays the role as the method which prevails in all three phrases in Heidegger's relation to metaphysics. The genuine spirit of this method can be described as that, through dialogue with the tradition, those who carry out the destruction of tradition will reveal something important that always works but is possibly non-evident or undiscovered, so as to promote to understand the tradition and thus to display the possible room provided by the tradition; (4) there is a close relationship that can not be ignored but needs to be handled with care between Heidegger's destructuring of metaphysics to theology. And this association refers to its theological origin, theological dimension and possible signification for theology; (5) whether the means such as the idea of the fourfold (das Giviert) of "sky, earth, divinities and mortals", by which Heidegger himself speaks of being, or the turn onto practical philosophy in current philosophical field; and whether the means of speech on religion or the design of contemporary path in Chinese philosophy's development, all of which remains undoubtedly in paradoxical state of farness and nearness of metaphysics.Speaking in detail, this research is composed of six parts and a prologue. The prologue mainly shows the fundamental framework in this investigation, which refers to the stage division of Heidegger's whole thought. As to this question, three representative ideas have been provided in the international Heidegger's circle. The first and the most prevailing, is brought by an American scholar who is called S. J. William John Richardson. According to this idea, later Heidegger can be different from early Heidegger in the light of the treatise "On the Essence of Truth" in 1930. Early Heidegger focuses on Dasein, while later Heidegger emphasizes on being. Nonetheless, this "turn" is inherent in movement of being, that is, being moves forward to Dasein just when Dasein goes forward to being. The second is hold by some commenters such as Hans-Georg Gadamer, Otto Poggeler and so on. On the basis of reading of Heidegger's "Early Lectures in Frelburg", they think that there is only one way in Heidegger because the sole subject-matter is to move toward being. The third represented Heribert Boeder suggests that, compared with the three entireties (God, world and soul) that traditional metaphysics concerns, the counterparts in contemporary thought are world, history and language. Correspondingly, Heidegger's thought can be divided into three stage united in one way, and they are respectively worldness (meaning), historicity (truth) and linguisticity (language). Three above ideas have their own reasons and have attracted many followers, but are on the whole spread around the means of Heidegger's own speaking being. In my opinion, although the question of being is the focal thing in Heidegger's thought, it is also the fundamental question in metaphysics. As a result, probing into Heidegger's thinking process from the standpoint of his relationship to metaphysics should not only highlight Heidegger's rich interaction with western tradition, but also help to show more clearly substantial tendency of his thought and power of his self-reflection. With regard to his relation to metaphysics, we prefer to divide Heidegger's thought into three main phrases, which are phenomenological decade (1917-1927), metaphysical decade (1927-1937) and the phrase of overcoming of metaphysics (1937-1976). Besides, the prologue also refers to the comment on research literature aboard and inland, the train of thought, some keys, some difficulties and main methods in this study.Chapter one reveals the motivation, substantial connotation, general effect and possible consequence of the assertion that metaphysics has a twofold onto-theo-logical approach since around 1937. Speaking simply, in order to deal with political-ethical nihilism in German and even in whole Europe during that time, Heidegger demands to detour into experiencing of the essence of metaphysics. According to Heidegger, guided by the question of being, metaphysics has a twofold approach of transcendence. One is ontological approach, which is along with essential-transcendental questioning in order to attain to universal thing, that is, the most universal being, the latter is idea in Plato, form in Aristotle, category in Kant, the parousia of the absolute in Hegel, and will to power in Nietzsche. The other is theological approach, which is along with existential-transcendent questioning so as to come up to the highest thing, the most true and self-sufficient being, and the latter is the idea of good in Plato, pure actuality or God in Aristotle, God as moral hypothesis in Kant, the absoluteness in its parousia to itself in Hegel, and eternal recurrence of the same in Nietzsche. However, each of the approach doesn't finally attain to being intended in transcendence, because two kinds of grounding don't precisely approach to being as abyness. Being that makes all beings as such is something self-unconcealment, self-sheltering or self-withdrawal, an absencing absence. Meanwhile, because of this twofold activity constitution of being itself, the forgetfulness of being is inescapable for metaphysics. Certainly, as nihilism, the forgetfulness of being in metaphysics yields a quite serious effect, a very excessive technological nihilism, the latter is overridingly dominating in current epoch that is full of numerous stifling crises. From this reason, metaphysics comes up to its consummation and succeeds in all aspects. Its final and complete realization also indicates a possibility of other beginning of history of being. Nonetheless, for present transition stage, a non-metaphysical philosophy or genuine thought should think of and experience of being within a fundamental attunement of startled, awe-full reservedness (erschreckend-scheuen Verhaltenheit), so as to prepare a way for other beginning of history of being.Chapter Two focuses on fundamental ontology which is formed during phenomenological decade and thus highlights its ontological character in essential-transcendental questioning. According to Heidegger, ontological approach in metaphysics lies in the fact that, a fundamental being gives the ground (ergrunden) for all other beings from the bottom up, which is a transcendental grounding with regard to the universal. Our investigation has demonstrated that, fundamental ontology is precisely such kind of grounding effort. One hand, fundamental ontology prefers to provide with some Dasein's universal characteristics such like its basic existential structure and temporality than with individuality and conditioned situation in Dasein's being. In fact, this existential analysis of Dasein discloses a kind of structure which seems to have some temporality but is no longer temporalizing and historical. On the other hand, Dasein's general authentic structure based on temporality is possibility condition of being. Obviously, this interpretation keeps up with the conclusion that Kant's transcendental critique has drawn, that is, "a priori self" or "transcendental apperception" and its constitution of understanding categories play a role as conditional possibility of all objects and all knowledge about them. More importantly, it is very difficult to approach to the sense of non-ontic being by means of this fundamental ontology with strong Kantian transcendental echo.Chapter three expounds metontology constructed in metaphysical decade by Heidegger and its traits of theological metaphysics. For Heidegger, theological metaphysics or theological approach in metaphysics lies in that, the highest being is a ground in sense of founding (begrunden) for all other beings, building the source which they could issue from and be justified on. This is a kind of grounding from above to below, which is transcendent grounding with regard to the existential mode of beings. However, we succeed in arguing that, metontology attempting to make beings as a whole thematized has a kind of general character of theological metaphysics, whether from the aspects of driving force (partially in order to onticlly justify Dasein's understanding of being as an ontical determination and thus to ground phenomenological ontology) and the method (by repetition of Aristotle's theology), or from the perspective of substantial effect. Besides, we think that, though metontology follow the theological approach in metaphysics, it also supply subsequent destructuring of metaphysics in the context of the idea of history of being with some important heritage, such as the question of fundamental attunement on which other beginning of history of being will depend, and as the question of the source of the concept "enowning" (Ereignis).Chapter four probes into the substantial modes in which destruction play a role as the method in driving the development and changing of Heidegger's relation to metaphysics. During phenomenological decade, hermeneutics or hermeneutical phenomenology Heidegger mainly develops aims at building a kind of fundamental ontology by destructuring of ancient Greek-Christian anthropology, thus grounding phenomenological ontology (i. e. metaphysics) in systemic sense. In the period of metaphysical decade, Heidegger's destruction lies in repetition of history in ontology so as to develop a kind of metontology, which not only tries to ground fundamental ontology and thus ontology as such, but also constitutes the important content of metaphysics. Of course, these two works of destructuring depend on Dasein's historicity, but Heidegger's destruction mainly takes on the form of overcoming metaphysics on the basis of new idea of history of being since around in 1937. And the overcoming of metaphysics doesn't mean to demolish metaphysics, but is recovery (Verwindung) of metaphysics. No matter what mode destructuring appears as, its genuine spirit lies in that, through dealing with and dialogue with tradition on and on, we will disclose something that always acts as conditioning but could always be ignored, so that we can deepen and expand our understanding on tradition and thus open a way for all new imagination and exploration.Chapter five mainly discusses theological origin, theological dimension and possible signification for theology of destructuring of metaphysics under the title "relations between Heidegger's destructuring of Metaphysics and Theology". An point is especially be put forward, that we can not completely deny the possibility and plausibility of Heidegger's philosophy's application into theology, but we should not absolutely ignore possible barriers and conflicts in the process.Chapter six, as conclusion part, raises four theses:(1) As representative means in which Heidegger himself speaks being, the idea of the fourfold of "sky, earth, divinities and mortals", should result from Aristotle's doctrine of four causes, but Heidegger brings about significant breakthrough and transformation from the standpoint of his time problems. (2) Confronted with ethical dilemma in technological times, a kind of effective solution could never be sought, so long as the effort is only limited into thinking about ethical norms and moral character regardless of research of question of being or something equal to metaphysics, or as Heidegger always remains in questioning of being in order that search for "the perfect package solutions".In my opinion, the needing path lies in thinking about the way to hang together the abstruse and lofty vision and the formation of substantial normative means. (3) In a so call post-metaphysical echo, it is inescapable of speaking significantly the basic matter in religion with metaphysics, at least with some conceptions, categories and reasoning. Of course, only in public dialogue on religion, could the finitude of the means of understanding and believing that every speaker holds be exposed, so as to help him be aware of his own finitude and thus adjust himself, enrich himself, etc. Only in this way could one enter into and shelter the fundamental condition which is indispensable for genuine religion and is called as "piety" in general, and could one design about "universal theology" be possible; (4) For current China remains and will continue to be under the control of technologism and thus of metaphysics in the future, any meaningful development of contemporary Chinese philosophy should not escape from deep investigation into metaphysics, or we could not understanding ourselves. From the other perspective, growing out of a kind of tradition of philosophy deeply different from metaphysics, we could find some counter-power more or less in our ancient books and records, arts, languages, antiquities and even modes of thinking and so on. To transform all this into effective power, needs to refine, gather and express these potential counter-power, which further needs to dig and refine some intelligible, filled with substantial content, and communicable concepts, categories and narrative frameworks from out of our own tradition, not resorting to metaphysical counterparts automatically or immoderately, because those metaphysical counterparts have their own irreducible, unusual substantial content and mode of function.