Disequilibrium Research On The Regulation Of The Medical Service In China

Medical service has close relationship with people's life and health, we need governmental regulation for medical service from protect the public interest. At the same time, medical service market embraces technique monopolization, information asymmetry and impure public goods'properties, which make it run away from the complete competition one, so the market failure asks for the governmental regulation. Regulation of medical service mainly includes entry regulation, price regulation and quality regulation.Regulation equilibrium means a state that regulation supply just meet for regulation demand. According to the interest groups, the groups are the demander, and the government institutions are the suppliers. The equilibrium state has two types, short-term static and long-term dynamic. Moreover, the cost restrictions and interest groups game influence the regulation equilibrium. As the supply doesn't equals to the demand, we call the regulation market state disequilibrium one, which has two types, vacancy and offside.The medical service market is a strict regulatory one. When we are making it into the market economic system, governmental regulation is either in vacancy or in offside which could not be the stable situation in the regulatory equilibrium. This led to the unfair collocation for medical sources, the embarrassment that the serious distortion for medical service suppliers, the increasing payments for demanders and the more terrible conflicts among hospitals and patients. Problems like difficulty and expensiveness in getting medical service and the inefficiency in medical lawsuits have become one of the focuses of the whole society. There are many reasons in explaining the bad social and economic effect from the governmental regulation in medical service. At the point of regulatory supply and demand, our medical service regulation now is in the obvious disequilibrium state. So this paper explains the problems of regulatory supply and demand from the above point, and studies deeply the regulation in the medical service, analyses the regulatory contents and explores the two critical influencing factors (cost restriction and game of interest groups) forming the regulatory equilibrium in order to find the internal mechanism of our dilemma in the regulation of our medical service and bring some suggestions for our regulation.Based on the rule of problems orientation, this paper tries to answer these questions that how the disequilibrium state of the entry regulation, the price regulation and the quality regulation of the medical servicre in China have been shaped and how we can change the regulation disequilibrium state to the equilibrium one.It is the regulation of Chinese medical service that is the main object here. At view of the two factors influcing regulation equilibrium above, this paper uses the interest groups regulation theory, the general economics analysis and the evolutionary game theory to explore how our regulation of medical service became the disequilibrium state and how to approach the equilibrium one. And all the discussion is under the framework of medical service regulation—effect factors—disequilibrium analysis.There are seven chapters in the dissertation and they are divided into three parts except the introduction.The first part includes the second and the third chapters. The former of the second chapter is the literature review of regulatory equilibrium theorem and mainly cards the study on regulatory theorem at home and abroad at the view of the cost restriction and the interest groups, which is the research foundation of the next chapter. And the latter of the second chapter gives the classification and the review at home and abroad about entry regulation, price regulation and quality regulation for the medical service, which also are the research foundation of the forth, fifth and sixth chapters. Basing on the first part of the second chapter, the third chapter makes a deeper study on the regulation equilibrium theorem. It supplies a creative research on the theorem around the two factors of the cost restriction and the interest groups. Firstly, it brings forward two concepts—communication cost and regulation intensity that help to form the specialization modal on the regulation supply and demand with the interest groups regulation theorem and prove the beigness of the communication cost on the regulatory equilibrium state. Moreover, the model has the static and dynamic types. Secondly, it introduces the relative content about the evolutionary game into the analysis on the regulation equilibrium, and explains the feasibility of using this game to study the regulation of medical services.The second part are the forth, fifth and sixth chapters. These three ones embrace the three contents of the regulation on the medical services in China. There are similar structures in the three chapters, but which discuss the three different regulation means and their regulation equilibrium analysis. Firstly, they explore their historical evolution, status and problems of these three regulation means. Secondly, from the point of two effect factors influencing regulatory equilibrium, it studies how the cost restriction and the interest groups influence the regulation problems using the regulation equilibrium theorem, deeply analyzes the disequilibrium reasons of three regulation contents and finds the internal mechanism of the current dilemma in our medical service regulation.The third part is the seventh chapter. Basing on the study of the regulation equilibrium about the different regulation contents, it advances the countermeasures and corresponding suggestions for the entry regulation, the price regulation and the quality regulation of the medical service in China.