Research On The Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Failures In China Based On Qca

The mark-up between ex-factory and the retail pharmaceutical price has been a common concern issue in China. Due to high pharmaceutical price adds to a heavy economic burden for the patient, government adopted different measures to curb rising drug prices, but the effect is not obvious.The government has abolished regulation of pharmaceutical price in China,because the tender price of centralized bidding system in public hospitals lower than ceiling price established by the government. So the ceiling price regulation has no effect on the control of pharmaceutical price. But after deregulation, the prices of some drugs began to rise,and the purchase price has no reference standard, so the pharmaceutical price will continue to raise. Because of information asymmetry, the pharmaceutical industry is easy to form the agency relationship and produce moral hazard behavior. It will lure patients purchase a rebate of drugs, and pharmaceutical price will still be inflated. Although China has canceled the policy of pharmaceutical price regulation, but in the long run, we also need to control it, the paper still has a strong significance. Therefore, the main point is to explore factors affecting pharmaceutical price and analyze reasons resulting from governmental regulation failure based on theoretical and empirical aspects, and put forward policy recommendations to address the failure of government regulation.According to the theory of health economics and regulatory economics, the dissertation analyzes the technical and economic characteristics of the pharmaceutical industry. The pharmaceutical industry is not a natural monopoly industry, in conditions of social health insurance, moral hazard arising from third-party payment is the reason of government regulation. According to the related theoretical analysis,this dissertation presents four important factors and hypothesis affecting the structure of pharmaceutical price,such as incentive regulation pattern,governmental regulation failure and qualitative comparative analysis. And the qualitative comparative analysis method is applied to test these hypotheses. Test results is non-incentive regulation pattern is the important one to influence the retail pharmaceutical price. According on the experiences of foreign pharmaceutical price regulation and the special current pharmaceutical market and medicine health care system in china, it proposed incentive regulation pattern can induce hospitals to purchase low-cost drugs andpharmaceutical manufacturer to set lower prices. It can be an effective way to solve the problem of high pharmaceutical price.