The Logic Of Collective Action And International Cooperation

The thesis is aimed at finding out the most decisive factor influencing the successof international cooperation on global issues. The author of the thesis holds that whenthe international public goods or common interests are not attractive enough to forceindividual states to join the collective actions and pay relevant costs, the so called"selective incentives" will play a decisive role in encouraging international collectiveactions and establishing new international regimes. Whether one state chooses to jointhe international cooperation and supports the new international regime rests on the"selective incentives" it receives, namely, how much individual benefit it may gainfrom the new regime, rather than the common interest itself. In terms of the jointeffort providing international public goods, states follow the logic of collective action,which was firstly proposed by Mancur Olson, a renowned American economist in hiscognominal book. If the new international regime cannot provide enough "selectiveincentives" to individual states, then the whole international community will find itvery difficult to form joint action and fulfill common interest. As all public goods bearthe characteristics of joint supply and joint consumption, and all state actors arerational and self-interested, it is natural to understand the free-ride tendency of eachstate in international collective actions and the effectiveness of differentiated"selective incentives" targeting on individual actors. Even if one actor does not jointhe collective action, it will still share the public goods, which makes it pay moreattention to the "selective incentives" solely given to it, rather than the group interest. The thesis, taking the example of long-term international negotiations on climatechange and the Kyoto Protocol signed by most states as the first binding agreement inthis area, makes analysis on the huge economic cost upon different types of stateswhen controlling greenhouse gases domestically, as well as the limited and vaguecommon interest that the Kyoto Protocol may achieve even when it is fullyimplemented. It also lists the differentiated interests that the Kyoto Protocol providesto various kinds of countries individually through designing the three "FlexibilityMechanisms," including the emission trading, joint implementation and the cleandevelopment mechanism. The first two mechanisms help industrialized nations toreduce cost of cutting their greenhouse gas emission, while the last one aims to bringbenefit to both developed and developing countries when they jointly launch emissionreduction projects. Although the emission trading itself does no help to the slowdownof global warming, the trading may bring billions of dollars to transitional economiessuch as Russia and Ukraine that own "hot air," which refers to the possibility thatthese countries might meet the Kyoto targets without any domestic action at all andthus be able to sell their surplus emission allowance without incurring any abatementcost. The clean development mechanism will also help developing countries likeChina to attract foreign investment worth billions of dollars with no cost. The authorbelieves this kind of individual benefit is the true incentive that pulls state actors intothe collective actions. Without such selective incentives, it is almost impossible forthe international community to sign a binding agreement in the area of globalwarming.The thesis makes thorough analysis on the final withdrawal of the United Statesfrom the Kyoto Protocol, Russia's long-time hesitation over the ratification issue, thepossible benefit that the protocol may bring to China and some developing countries'proposal of joining the emission trading, proving that it is often the differentiatedindividual benefit or penalty that attracts a nation to join the international cooperationon global public issues, rather than the public interest itself.The thesis, through studying the case of Kyoto Protocol, proposes a new researchpattern that may be applied to the study of other global public issues and design ofinternational regimes shaping international cooperation. The success of internationalcooperation and institution in area of global public issues depends on effectiveselective incentives including enough social pressures and credit shed to individualstates, as well as the existence of some enthusiast states boosting negotiations andpersuading potential veto states through providing additional benefit.