Mechanisms Of SO₂ Tradable Emission Permits System

With the development of the society economic,the environmental pollution is becoming more and more serious. Since 20^th century,all of the world have taken various environment manage methods to deal with this problem. Nowadays,China gives out a new thoughts of environment manage,which is total quantity control of pollution.A useful method of implementing total quantity control is the Tradable Emission Permit system(TEPs),which is proposed in 1970s and has been applied for a long time, so it is more important to take the theoretic and practice research of the TEPs.In the paper,on the background of the TEPs under the total quantity control of pollution,stands in the environment superintendent's angle,it takes economics, system theory,game theory and methods as study tools.The research goal aims at the supervising and managing method of the current environment problems.It proposes a series of new method and the mentality,gives the theoretically suggestion to certain policy behavior.First the paper introduces the basic concepts,the main research aspects and problems of the TEPs.Then the research about the TEPs using economic theory and methods is summarized.Finally it points out that,this article is for the purpose of building a bridge between the fundamental research and the practice,give out some news solutions,thoughts and advice in the implement of TEPs.From the economical analysis of the environment problem,it analyses the public goods,property right, market malfunction and policy malfunction.The conclusion is that the best choice of solve the environment question is economic method.What's more,it analyses the theory basis-The Coss theorem.The Coss theorem and the law of value constituted the TEPs rationale.The mechanism of the extra emission motoring is the tool of ensuring the implement of TEPs.To prevent the firms from extra emission,the mechanism of motoring has to be established by government.The action and equilibrium strategies of the government and the firms are analyzed.And effluence of the public monitoring mechanism to the players is discussed.The conclusion includes that if the firms have reputation lost,the penalty can be substitute of the equilibrium check probability of to some extent when it is big enough.At the end,the research work is summarized and a perspective on the future research work is made.